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I.1 Introduction
This book uses microdata from diverse Latin American and Caribbean
countries to investigate the impact of regulation on their labor markets.
Common methodologies are applied to extract empirical regularities from
the region. Latin America and the Caribbean are of interest in their own
right. But for several reasons, the lessons learned from studies of these la-
bor markets have much greater generality.
The shifts in the policy regimes experienced in the region are dramatic
by  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) standards, and many of these regime shifts are exogenous. This
large and exogenous variation provides identifying power not available to
analysts studying regulation in Europe and North America. Given the ev-
idence on the comparability of labor demand functions around the world
summarized in Hamermesh (1993 and chap. 11 in this volume), lessons
about the impact of regulation learned from Latin American labor markets
apply more generally.
The studies in this volume are based on microdata. Use of such data
avoids reliance on fragile country aggregate statistics that have been the
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American Development Bank or its board of directors.main source of information used to study European regulation (see, e.g.,
the evidence summarized in Nickell and Layard 1999). Countries have di-
verse economic regions and agents, and aggregation over these regions and
their economic agents masks this diversity. In this chapter, we show the sen-
sitivity of estimates of the impact of regulation obtained from conventional
pooled time series cross sections of countries to alternative choices of
samples and models, although a few important empirical regularities es-
tablished at the microlevel hold up in macrodata. Our analysis builds the
case for doing disaggregated analyses of the type reported in this book.
The evidence presented here challenges one prevailing view that labor
market regulations aﬀect only the distribution of labor incomes and have
minor eﬀects on eﬃciency.1 The results presented in this volume suggest
that mandated beneﬁts reduce employment and that job security regula-
tions have a substantial impact on the distribution of employment and on
turnover rates. The most adverse impact of regulation is on youth, mar-
ginal workers, and unskilled workers. Insiders and entrenched workers
gain from regulation, but outsiders suﬀer. As a consequence, job security
regulations promote inequality among demographic groups. Most of the
individual country studies demonstrate that regulations promoting job se-
curity reduce covered worker exit rates out of employment and out of un-
employment, and on balance reduce employment.
This introductory essay has three main goals: (1) It summarizes the main
lessons to be drawn from the studies assembled here; (2) It places the Latin
American and Caribbean (LAC) regulatory burden in an international
context by comparing the level and changes in LAC labor regulation poli-
cies with those in OECD countries, as well as providing some historical
context about the origins of this regulation; and (3) It updates the work of
Heckman and Pagés (2000) with an expanded sample and better measures
of regulation, providing a cross-country time-series analysis of the impact
of regulation on employment and unemployment. We quantify the cost of
regulation in LAC and OECD regions. The fragility of the macro-based es-
timates documented in our paper suggests one reason why relatively little
is known about the impact of regulations in Europe, despite an abundance
of cross-country time series papers analyzing policies in that region. How-
ever, the macro time series literature does produce some empirical regular-
ities. The methods used to analyze the microevidence presented in this
book should be extended to produce more convincing evidence of the im-
pacts of regulations on employment in the OECD region.2
This chapter proceeds in the following way. Section I.2 provides back-
ground on Latin American economic and labor market performance. Sec-
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1. Freeman (2000) and Nickell and Layard (1999), among others, adopt this view.
2. See, however, the studies of Abowd et al. (1997), Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
Abowd et al. (2000), Machin and Stewart (1996), Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002), and
others, who use microdata to investigate the impact of regulation in Europe.tion I.3 presents some basic facts about regulation in LAC and compares
LAC with OECD countries both in terms of the level and composition of
labor cost and in terms of the labor market reforms experienced in the re-
gion. Section I.4 summarizes the main lessons from the essays presented in
this book. Section I.5 updates Heckman and Pagés (2000) and uses the cost
measures derived in section I.3 to examine the impacts of labor regulation
on Latin American and OECD employment and unemployment rates. Sec-
tion I.6 concludes and makes suggestions for future work on regulation in
Latin American and OECD labor markets. We ﬁrst present some back-
ground on Latin America and the nature of labor market regulation in the
region.
I.2 Latin American Economic and Labor Market Performance
Latin American economic performance has been quite disappointing.
Since 1970, growth of income per capita has been just over 1 percent per
year, higher than in Africa or the Middle East, but much lower than in Asia
or in the developed countries (ﬁgure 1). Up to the 1980s, trade policies heav-
ily protected Latin American economies from foreign competition. There
was a substantial degree of intervention by the state in the economy. The col-
lapse of most economies during that decade due to growing ﬁscal and mon-
etary imbalances led many countries to implement large structural reforms
towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. Macroeconomic stabilization
policies reduced ﬁscal deﬁcits and brought inﬂation under control. Sweep-
ing, fast-paced trade reforms lowered substantial tariﬀbarriers on manufac-
tured goods. Governments undertook ﬁscal reforms, lifted control over ﬁ-
nancial markets, and privatized most state-owned ﬁrms. Some countries also
embarked on labor reforms described in the next section. While growth rates
in the 1990s were higher than they were during the 1980s, the rates of growth
in this period still fell short of those attained in other parts of the world.
Among the countries covered in this volume (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago),
Chile was the best performer, with an average growth rate of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) of 4.8 during the period 1980–2001 (see table 1). Ar-
gentina and Trinidad and Tobago experienced the lowest average growth
during the past two decades, despite high average growth rates during the
nineties.
In spite of this weak economic performance, GDP per capita (purchas-
ing power parity [PPP] US$ adjusted) levels in Latin American countries
are higher than those of other developing regions. According to the World
Bank Development Indicators, in 2001 the average GDP per capita in the
Latin America and the Caribbean region was $7,050, considerably higher
than that of East Asia and the Paciﬁc ($4,233), Central and Eastern Eu-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Arab States ($5,038). Similarly, the regional Human Development Index
computed by the United Nations for LAC (0.77) was almost as high as in
Central and Eastern Europe (0.78) and higher than in any other region ex-
cept for the OECD (0.90). Among the countries whose labor markets are
analyzed in this volume, Barbados and Argentina exhibited the highest in-
come per capita and human development indexes, while Jamaica and Peru
rank the lowest among the countries, both in per capita income and in hu-
man development (see table 1).
While GDP growth rates were not high, during the period 1980–1999
employment rates grew in the nine countries studied here. The highest
growth rates were recorded in Colombia and Peru, countries that also ex-
perienced fast growth in female labor force participation. In contrast, av-
erage employment growth rates were low in Trinidad and Tobago and in
Argentina. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) and
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) data, average urban unemployment rates during the 1980s and
1990s exceeded 8 percent in all countries analyzed in this book except for
Brazil. Unemployment comparisons should be treated cautiously because
they are not strictly comparable. For instance, in the Caribbean countries
the unemployment rates include discouraged workers (those who drop out
of the labor force), while such workers are excluded in the Latin American
countries, which compute unemployment rates according to more tradi-
tional deﬁnitions.3Many have remarked that the high level of regulation of
economic activity in the region accounts for problems in the labor markets
in the region, and the essays assembled here shed light on this conjecture.
I.3 Labor Market Regulations and Institutions 
in Latin America and the Caribbean
This section sketches the history of labor market regulation in the region
and describes and quantiﬁes the regulatory environment in Latin America
and the Caribbean. It compares the level of regulation and pace of regula-
tory reform in LAC countries and OECD countries. When it is credible to
do so, we also make an eﬀort to quantify the monetary costs (as a percent-
age of wages) of full compliance with regulations without discussing
whether costs are borne by workers or ﬁrms. We discuss this issue more ex-
tensively in sections I.4 and I.5.
I.3.1 Regulations Governing Individual Contracts
Throughout Latin America, labor codes determine the types of con-
tracts, the lengths of trial periods, and the conditions of part-time work.
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3. That is, they only include persons who are available for work and who are taking speciﬁc
steps to search for a job.Regulations favor full-time, indeﬁnite contracts over part-time, ﬁxed-term
or temporary contracts. As a form of worker protection, labor codes man-
date a minimum advance notice period prior to termination, specify which
causes are considered justiﬁed causes for dismissal, and establish compen-
sation to be awarded to workers depending on the reason for the termina-
tion. In contrast, temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost, pro-
vided that the duration of the contract has expired. To prevent ﬁrms from
exclusively hiring workers under temporary contracts, in most countries
the use of such arrangements is severely restricted. Labor codes also limit
trial periods—that is, the period of time during which a ﬁrm can test and
dismiss a worker at no cost if his or her performance is considered unsatis-
factory.
Although most OECD countries began regulating their labor markets
when they had attained relatively high income per capita, Latin America
and other developing countries started regulating their markets much ear-
lier in the development process (Lindauer 1999). The ﬁrst regulations date
from the beginning of the twentieth century. The motivation for these reg-
ulations was the perceived need to protect the welfare of workers against
the excessive power of employers, and to insure workers against the risk of
job loss and income insecurity (Lindauer 1999). The Mexican Constitution
of 1917 articulated the principle that protecting workers was one of the du-
ties of the state. By the 1930s and 1940s, most countries had a labor code.
The belief that each new reform should only strengthen the set of war-
ranties and beneﬁts awarded from previous laws became widespread. For
many years, successive reforms expanded the protection that the law af-
forded to workers. There was little examination of the question of whether
such regulations would aﬀect economic performance. However, until the
1980s most countries in the LAC region were isolated and their industries
heavily protected. Labor regulations were one way of distributing the rents
from protection among covered workers and employers. Regulations are a
low-cost way (from the point of government ﬁscal authorities) of provid-
ing social insurance to protect workers. The weak ﬁscal systems in place in
the region together with the low level of income, and a tradition of tax eva-
sion, corruption, and noncompliance made the social insurance schemes
used in more developed countries prohibitively costly.
Military rule often led to deregulation of labor markets. Unions were
frequent targets, as much for political as for economic reasons. The politi-
cal and economic environment in LAC changed substantially in the 1980s
and 1990s. Most countries restored democracy after long periods of mili-
tary rule. These political changes bred some labor reforms—ﬁrst, to re-
store union activity, which had been made illegal in many military regimes
and, second, to reach a new social pact. In Chile, Brazil, and the Domini-
can Republic, at the beginning of the 1990s and later in Nicaragua in 1996,
these reforms produced more protective labor regulations.
Introduction 7A new constitution was enacted in 1988 in Brazil as part of the process
of redemocratization during the second half of the 1980s (see Barros and
Corseuil, chap. 5 in this volume). This new constitution revised labor reg-
ulations that had been in place since the 1940s. The new constitution re-
duced the maximum working hours per week from forty-eight to forty-four
hours; reduced the maximum number of hours for a continuous work shift
from eight to six hours; increased the minimum overtime premium from 20
percent to 50 percent; increased maternity leave from three to four months;
and increased the value of paid vacations from 1/3 to at least 4/3 of the nor-
mal monthly wage. The new constitution also modiﬁed the mandatory in-
dividual saving accounts system created in 1966. Prior to the reforms, the
law required employers to deposit 8 percent of employees’ wages into a
worker-owned account. In case of a ﬁrm-initiated separation, workers
could withdraw the accumulated funds (plus the interest rate). In addition,
if a ﬁrm initiated a separation, it had to pay a penalty equivalent to 10 per-
cent of the amount accumulated in the account. As part of the 1988 reform,
this penalty was increased to 40 percent, considerably increasing the cost
of dismissing a worker.
In the case of Chile, the 1990 reform introduced with the return to
democracy reestablished some of the protection to workers that had been
eliminated during the military regime. Under the dictatorship, union ac-
tivity had been severely restricted and some beneﬁts, such as indemnities
for dismissal, had been substantially reduced.4 In 1990, the new law in-
creased maximum indemnities from ﬁve to eleven months of pay. It also
reintroduced the need for ﬁrms to prove just cause for dismissal, although
unlike the case in other countries, the new law considered the economic
needs of the ﬁrm a just cause.
While in some countries lawmakers were busy increasing legal protec-
tion for workers, the economic environment was changing substantially.
The deep economic crisis that ensued with the debt crisis of the early 1980s
called into question the protectionist model. The relatively good perfor-
mance of the Chilean economy, which in the mid-1970s opened to trade
and introduced many promarket reforms, spawned imitators all across
Latin America. By the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, most
countries had drastically reduced tariﬀs on imports. The new openness to
international trade increased the demand for labor market ﬂexibility. It was
argued that without sweeping labor market reforms, Latin American
economies would not be able to compete internationally. This was the main
motivation behind the reforms that introduced temporary contracts in Ar-
gentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru and that reduced the
cost of dismissing workers with indeﬁnite contracts in Colombia (1990)
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4. See Montenegro and Pagés, chap. 7 in this volume.and Peru (1991). Temporary and ﬁxed-term contracts were introduced in
Argentina in 1991, and their role was expanded in 1995 (see Hopenhayn,
chap. 9 in this volume). These changes were inﬂuenced by similar reforms
in Spain during the 1980s. Special ﬁxed-term duration employment pro-
motion contracts could be awarded to unemployed workers and to work-
ers younger than twenty-ﬁve and older than forty years old. For some types
of contracts, severance pay was reduced by 100 percent. However, these
contracts were eliminated in 1998, when the share of persons working un-
der these arrangements had increased substantially. Ecuador, Peru, and
Colombia also lifted restrictions on the use of these types of programs in
the early 1990s. In Peru, the number of workers hired under these contracts
increased enormously. In Brazil, the use of such contracts has been liber-
alized since 1998.
The 1991 reforms in Peru reduced the cost of dismissing workers hired
under indeﬁnite contracts. During 1971–1991, workers who had completed
trial periods were granted permanent job security. If a ﬁrm dismissed a
worker and could not prove just cause in labor courts, the worker could
choose between being reinstated in his or her job or receiving a severance
payment of three months’ wages per year of work (with a maximum of
twelve months pay). In practice, because workers could always ask to be re-
instated and then settle for a higher severance pay, the mandatory amount
was a lower bound of the ﬁring cost. See Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in
this volume).
Beginning in 1991, workers hired after that year could be dismissed at
will upon payment of a severance beneﬁt. In addition, just cause clauses
were extended to allow the dismissal of workers who did not perform up to
expectations. The severance pay schedule was reduced from three months’
wages to one month’s wage for every year of tenure for workers with more
than one year in the ﬁrm, with a minimum of three months’ wages and a
maximum of twelve. The 1993 constitution replaced the right of workers to
a permanent job with the right of ﬁrms to dismiss workers. In July 1995, a
second wave of labor reforms simpliﬁed the severance payment to one
month per year of work, up to a maximum of twelve months, and the two-
tier severance system was eliminated. These modiﬁcations substantially re-
duced the cost of dismissing workers. However, in November 1996 the sev-
erance payments rule was increased again to one and one-half months’
wages per year of work, with an unaltered maximum cap of twelve wages.
In Colombia, the 1990 labor reforms liberalized many aspects of labor
regulation. Besides regulations introducing the use of temporary con-
tracts, the most important changes were those in the Cesantias, or sever-
ance pay that ﬁrms owed to workers at the end of the work relationship, re-
gardless of the cause or the party that initiated separation. Prior to the
reforms, employers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year
at the time of the separation based on the salary at the separation. Work-
Introduction 9ers could obtain advanced payments against their beneﬁts. Such with-
drawals were credited against the severance pay due to workers at the end
of the labor relationship in nominal terms as of the date of the withdrawal.
High rates of inﬂation increased the costs of such schemes to employers.
After the reform, the withdrawals were credited in real terms, substantially
reducing costs for ﬁrms. In addition, the reforms eliminated the right to re-
instatement for workers with more than ten years of tenure. Oﬀsetting
these cost-reducing features, the reforms increased the cost of indemnities
for dismissal.
Panama (1995) and Venezuela (1997) also undertook labor reforms with
the goal of increasing labor market ﬂexibility while preserving some form
of protection to workers. In both countries, reforms increased mandatory
pay in case of separation but considerably reduced the additional amount
that ﬁrms had to pay in case of a ﬁrm-initiated dismissal.
In contrast to Latin American regulation, in the Caribbean a mixture of
legislation, common law doctrines, custom, and policy characterizes the
institutional context. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in all coun-
tries of that region, regulation of the labor market was based on common
law rather than on the civil law tradition predominant in Latin America
(see Downes, Mamingi, and Antoine, chap. 10 in this volume). While in
some countries, like Barbados, most aspects of labor relation are still left
to the courts to determine; in others, such as in Trinidad and Tobago, the
enactment of diﬀerent regulations has progressively increased the level of
statutory protection to workers. In Barbados (1973), Trinidad and Tobago
(1974), and Jamaica (1985), labor reforms instituted mandatory severance
pay, although, as shown in the next section, at levels that are much lower
than those prevalent in Latin America.
I.3.2 Payroll Contributions and Other Mandatory Beneﬁts
As in most industrial countries, in LAC many social protection pro-
grams, such as old-age pensions, public health systems, unemployment
subsidies, and family allowances are funded from payroll contributions. In
addition, regulations mandate other employee-paid beneﬁts such as occu-
pational health and safety provisions, maternity and sick leave, overtime
pay, and vacations.
Unlike changes in labor codes that tend to be infrequent events, changes
in the level of contributions to these programs occur often. In addition,
during the 1990s, many countries implemented reforms, which trans-
formed pay-as-you-go systems into full or partial capitalization systems.
One of the advantages of such schemes is that they tend to increase the link
between contributions and beneﬁts. However, at the same time, many
countries, most noticeably Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, and
Brazil, increased the level of payroll taxes to reduce the actuarial imbal-
ances present in their social security systems. Below, we quantify the levels
10 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagésand changes in these contributions across Latin America and OECD coun-
tries.
I.3.3 Collective Bargaining
Unions in Latin America tend to be ﬁrm- or sector-based and weak. In
most cases, the state intervenes in union registration and accreditation as
well as in the process of collective bargaining. The state authorizes only
certain unions to have representation authority (Argentina, Mexico, Peru,
and Brazil), and intervenes in the resolution of conﬂicts and the arbitration
process (Argentina and Mexico). Only in Brazil and Argentina is collective
bargaining highly centralized at the sector level, while in Nicaragua and
Colombia, sector-level bargaining coexists with ﬁrm-based negotiation.
In Mexico, collective bargaining takes place at the ﬁrm level, but a high
level of centralization is achieved through a strong corporatist structure
and through union discipline (O’Connell 1999). In contrast, unions are
stronger, and collective bargaining tends to be national or sector-based in
OECD countries, with the exception of Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
According to data from ILO (1997–1998), union density as a percentage
of nonagricultural employment is higher in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and
Nicaragua and smaller in the rest of the Latin American countries. Union
aﬃliation tends to be higher in countries where collective bargaining is
more centralized. Overall, union density is lower in Latin America (14.7)
than in industrial countries (36.6).5 There are also large diﬀerences in cov-
erage rates. Thus, while collective bargaining agreements in countries such
as Spain, France, and Greece, which are negotiated by a minority, are ex-
tended to almost all employees, in Latin American countries this is gener-
ally not the case. As a result, coverage rates in Latin America tend to be
much lower than those observed in OECD countries with similar aﬃliation
rates.
The inﬂuence that collective bargaining exerts on wage and employment
conditions, measured by aﬃliation rates, is declining over time. Thus, LAC
countries share a trend that has been well documented for OECD coun-
tries. Aﬃliation rates have declined in all of the countries of the region.6
This decline has been especially large in Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela,
Costa Rica, and Uruguay. In this volume, we only present estimates for
Uruguay on the impact of unionization on employment. Cassoni, Allen,
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5. ILO data corresponds to the mid-1990s. The comparison between LAC and industrial
countries reﬂects the diﬀerence between unweighted regional averages. The average for in-
dustrial countries includes the following countries: France, Spain, United States, Greece,
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden,
and Canada.
6. The ILO data for 1985 and 1993 indicates that union aﬃliation increased in Chile during
that period. Yet, data from a later period indicates that union aﬃliation has been declining
since 1993.and Labadie (chap. 8 in this volume) estimate a strong adverse impact of
unionism on employment in Uruguay. The evidence for other Latin Amer-
ican countries is still too sparse.
I.3.4 Minimum Wages
Minimum wages are widely used in Latin America to increase the wages
of the poorest workers. Figure 2(taken from Maloney and Nuñez Mendez,
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Fig. 2 Minimum wage/mean wage in OECD countries and in Latin America
Source: Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (chap. 1 in this volume).
Notes: Minimum wages from Dolado et al. (1996), for one year within the range 1991 and
1995. Minimum wages for Latin America are from 1995 or 1996, except Argentina (1998), Bo-
livia (1997), Brazil (1998), Colombia (1998), Honduras (1999), Mexico (1999), and Uruguay
(1998).chap. 1 in this volume) ranks various Latin American and OECD countries
by their minimum wage, standardized by the mean wage.7 While some
Latin American countries appear in the lower range of this distribution—
most notably Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico—
others, such as Venezuela, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Honduras, have very
high minimum to average minimum wages by OECD standards. These
high levels suggest that minimum wages are likely to be binding, and, as a
result, to reduce employment and to retard downward wage movements in
the presence of adverse demand shocks.
Data on enforcement of the minimum wage is incomplete. However,
some evidence available for workers between twenty-ﬁve and forty years
old suggests that about 10 percent of wage employees in that age range earn
salaries below the minimum wage (see table 2). In some countries, such as
Mexico, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Argentina, the proportion below the mini-
mum in this age range is very small. In other countries, such as Colombia,
minimum to average wages are high but a large proportion of the labor
force in the twenty-ﬁve to forty age range earns wages below the statutory
minimum. Whether the adverse eﬀect of a high level of minimum wages is
oﬀset by substantial noncompliance remains an open empirical question.
I.3.5 What Motivates Reforms?
In studying the eﬀect of reforms in the labor market it is important to ex-
amine what factors initiate these relatively infrequent episodes. It could be
argued that labor market outcomes are driven by the same events that drive
the reforms and not by the labor reforms themselves. Panels A–F of ﬁgure
3( f or Latin America) and panels G–I of ﬁgure 3 (for the Caribbean) plot
GDP growth rates and unemployment rates for the countries covered in the
individual country studies of this volume during the period 1980–2000.
They also plot major episodes of labor reform (marked with a continuous
line if a liberalization of the labor market occurred and a dotted line if the
reforms increased protection to workers).8 In addition, these ﬁgures mark
episodes of major tariﬀ reductions (double line) or the end of military
regimes and the return to democracy (discontinuous line).
In Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, reforms that liberalized
the labor market occurred within one or two years before or after major re-
ductions in tariﬀs and were part of eﬀorts to liberalize economies and in-
crease the participation of the market in the production and allocation of
goods and services. In Chile and Brazil, reforms that increased the legal
Introduction 13
7. The observations are from the early 1990s for the OECD countries and from the mid- and
late 1990s for LAC. Data from OECD were obtained from Dolado et al. (1996), data from LAC
comes from IADB (1998–1999) and Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (chap. 1 in this volume).
8. Only major changes in labor codes or other major government interventions in the labor
market are included. Changes in social security contributions or payroll taxes, as well as
changes in the level of minimum wages—which occur quite frequently—are not included.protection of workers occurred in the context of a transition to democracy.
In all of these episodes it could be argued that labor reforms were exoge-
nous to the economic system because they were driven either by a new eco-
nomic philosophy or by profound transformations in political regimes, al-
though one could counter that these political transitions were facilitated
by economic developments. Some reforms and transformations are clearly
driven by changes in economic activity. There is evidence that many re-
forms tend to occur around periods of negative economic growth. In the
countries and periods analyzed in this volume, there have been at least ﬁf-
teen episodes of reform. Out of these ﬁfteen, six episodes of reform oc-
curred in years in which GDP had declined the year before. However, four
of those reforms increased the legal protection to workers, and two liberal-
ized the labor market.
Overall, there is no empirical relationship between labor reforms and la-
bor market outcomes driven by economic performance. Our cross-country
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Table 2 Compliance with Regulations
% of Workers  % of Workers 25–40 Years 
with Mandatory Social  Old with Net Earnings Below 
Security Programs Minimum Wage
% of Total % of Wage Noncompliance with
Employment Employment Minimum Wages
Country (Mean 1990s) (Mean 1990s) (End 1990s)
Average Latin Americaa 42.76 60.05 10.06
Argentina 48.45 66.56 3.11
Bolivia (1999) 26.36 38.56 1.11
Brazil 48.18 64.04 5.80
Chile 64.47 77.45 7.3
Colombia (1999) 46.13 66.77 26.9
Costa Rica 65.92 74.61 15.7
Dominican Republic (1998) 29.08 49.40 n.a.
Ecuador (1995) 30.94 43.02 n.a.
El Salvador (1998) 33.49 50.04 3.6
Mexico 52.53 67.96 0.5
Panama (2001) 55.66 74.50 14.8
Paraguay (1995) 16.70 30.66 n.a.
Peru 17.99 51.90 23.5
Uruguay 74.12 93.12 0.5
Venezuela (1998) 31.37 52.22 17.9
Source: IADB (2004), based on individual country household surveys.
Notes:Percentage of workers between ﬁfteen and sixty-four that are aﬃliated to social security. Time se-
ries data for the 1990s is incomplete; the mean was computed when data included three or more years,
spread over three periods: early (1990–1993), mid (1994–1997), and late (1998–2001). Noncompliance
with minimum wage refers to employees between twenty-ﬁve and forty years old working more than









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)time series analysis presented in this chapter controls for present and past
levels of economic activity to account for the possibility of endogeneity.
The disaggregated studies use year eﬀects and other strategies to control
for endogeneity.
I.3.6 Quantifying the Cost of Regulation
This section constructs measures of labor laws that can be compared
across countries and time (see also Heckman and Pagés 2000). Many stud-
ies that summarize institutional data across countries construct qualitative
indices that rank variables across countries. For instance, Grubb and Wells
(1993) construct a series of indicators of employment protection by rank-
ing diﬀerent aspects of job protection across countries and averaging these
diﬀerent rankings in one summary indicator. Although such measures
summarize many complex institutional features, they are not comparable
over time. A second group of studies constructs measures that aggregate
institutional aspects of the labor market by assigning to each country and
year a value in a certain range, for instance, between zero and one. These
measures summarize a large number of interesting aspects and are compa-
rable across time. However, they can also be quite arbitrary because it is
diﬃcult to justify any assigned numerical values for qualitative variables,
and because it is diﬃcult to compare one measure against another. More-
over, the measures are very sensitive to the weights assigned to the diﬀerent
components of these measures. From a policy standpoint, summarizing
many features of a regulatory system in one indicator makes it impossible to
distinguish which components, if any, have an adverse eﬀect on employment.
We take a diﬀerent route by constructing measures of the direct cost
(measured as a fraction of average monthly wages) of complying with la-
bor laws. These measures can be compared not only across countries and
over time, but they can also be compared against each other. This allows us
to quantify, for instance, the share of the total costs given by each type of
regulation. Our measure of mandatory total costs (TC) of regulations is
TC   SSP   JS.
It is the sum of the cost of social security payments (SSP) plus the cost of
abiding by job security provisions (JS). These costs are expressed as frac-
tions of the average monthly wage.
This measure of the cost of regulation omits some important compo-
nents of labor cost. For example, the costs of abiding by certain laws are
hard to quantify and are omitted. One example of laws whose costs are
diﬃcult to quantify is the prohibition against dismissing workers in bad
times. In addition, this measure does not include the cost of regulating the
length of the standard workweek and overtime work. It does not include
the cost of complying with minimum wage laws or other income ﬂoors. We
do not include regulations on temporary labor contracts. Although these
24 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagésregulations are likely to have eﬀects on employment and unemployment,
we choose to exclude them because comparable data on the share of the la-
bor force aﬀected by these regulations across time and countries are diﬃ-
cult to obtain. We leave the quantiﬁcation of these features of regulations
for future work.
There is one major conceptual problem with this index. It does not dis-
tinguish between static and dynamic aspects of the cost of labor. Job secu-
rity aﬀects both components of costs by raising the total cost of labor and
by increasing the cost of adjusting labor. Social security costs aﬀect the
unit cost of labor without aﬀecting dynamic costs of labor. Our index of to-
tal cost is not a measure of the price of labor facing ﬁrms at diﬀerent stages
of the business cycle. We develop this point below and in appendix B.
Quantifying Job Security Provisions
Our index includes, in job security legislation, those provisions of the law
that increase the cost of dismissing a worker for economic reasons.9Across
countries, termination laws require ﬁrms to incur at least ﬁve types of
costs: administrative procedures, advance notiﬁcation, indemnities for
dismissal, seniority pay, and the legal costs of a trial if workers contest
dismissals. Administrative procedures require the ﬁrm to notify and seek
approval by labor unions or the Ministry of Labor to extend the period
between layoﬀ decisions and the actual occurrence of layoﬀs. They may
also involve long negotiations to place workers in alternative jobs. The pe-
riod of advance notiﬁcation should also be included in the computation of
labor costs because in many countries, laws allow ﬁrms to choose between
providing advance notice or paying a compensation equivalent to the
wages for the corresponding period. Moreover, since productivity declines
substantially after notice, advance notiﬁcation should be considered as a
part of dismissal costs even when ﬁrms choose to notify workers in ad-
vance. Therefore, we assume that employees do not work at full productiv-
ity levels after notiﬁcation.10 In most countries, mandatory advance notice
periods increase with tenure, and in others they are higher for white-collar
than for blue-collar workers.
Most Latin American and OECD countries mandate indemnities in
cases of ﬁrm-initiated dismissal. In general, indemnities are based on mul-
tiples of the most recent wage and the years of service. Some countries cal-
culate the amount of mandatory indemnities based on whether the dis-
missal is deemed just or unjust or whether the worker is blue collar or white
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9. In most countries, the law does not mandate compensation for dismissal if the separation
is due to employees’ misdemeanors. However, if such behavior cannot be proved, the worker
has to be compensated at the regular legal rate.
10. There is some evidence that advance notice stimulates on-the-job search during the no-
tiﬁcation period (Addison and Portugal 1992), which suggests a reduction in the eﬀort de-
voted to work.collar. In contrast, seniority pay is only mandated in a few Latin American
countries in which the law requires employers to make a payment upon ter-
mination of the work relationship, regardless of the cause or party initi-
ating the separation. In these countries, ﬁrms initiating dismissal are re-
quired to pay both indemnities and seniority pay. In some countries, this
payment is deposited as a regular contribution to the worker’s individual
savings account. In these countries, workers can withdraw principal and
interest from their account upon separation. In other countries, seniority
pay is determined as a given amount that has to be paid to the worker upon
termination of the work relationship.11 Finally, ﬁrms can incur consider-
able additional costs if workers contest dismissal in courts. If judges rule in
favor of workers, ﬁrms not only have to pay indemnities, but also the work-
ers’ foregone wages during trial.
To compute the monetary cost of labor laws, we improve on the job se-
curity measures developed in Heckman and Pagés (2000) in three ways.
First, we expand our previous database to include the 1980s in all OECD
countries. This expansion of the data set allows us to capture some addi-
tional labor reforms in OECD countries not previously captured. Second,
we revise and correct some of our previous data on advance notice and in-
demnities for a number of countries to better capture the actual cost of the
law (see appendix A for a complete description of the methodology and as-
sumptions involved). Finally, we include the cost of seniority pay in our
measure of job security, which we did not include in our previous work.
Our measure of the cost of job security, JSjt, for country jat time tis con-
structed from the following formula:
(1) JSjt  ∑
T
i 1








  ANj,t   IDj,t  SenP j,t,
where   is the probability of a worker remaining in a job in a period,   is
the discount factor, i denotes tenure at the ﬁrm, and T is the maximum
tenure that a worker can attain in a ﬁrm, which is assumed to be twenty
years (T   20). The expression is broken down into three terms corre-
sponding to advanced notice costs (ANj,t), indemnity costs (IDj,t), and sen-
iority pay (SenPj,t). The ﬁrst term in expression (1) is the discounted cost of
future advance notice, weighted by the probability that a worker will be dis-
missed, after one, two, three, and so on periods at the ﬁrm, where bj,t iis the
advance notice to a worker who has been i years at a ﬁrm measured in
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11. For an extensive description of job security measures, see OECD (1993, 1999) for
OECD countries and IADB (1996) for Latin America.monthly wages. The second term in expression (1) is the discounted cost of
future indemnities, weighted by the probability of dismissal after i periods
at the ﬁrm. In this expression, aj denotes the probability that the economic
diﬃculties of the ﬁrm are considered a just cause of dismissal, while yj,t ijc
(yj,t iuc) is the mandated indemnity in case of just cause (unjust cause) dis-
missal, again measured in monthly wages. Finally, the third term in ex-
pression (1) captures the cost of seniority pay, and cj,t i denotes contribu-
tions to a worker’s savings account measured in monthly wages.12 We
assume a common discount and dismissal rate of 8 and 12 percent, respec-
tively, across countries. The choice of the discount rate is based on the his-
torical returns of an internationally diversiﬁed portfolio. Our choice of the
turnover rate is motivated by the concern that turnover rates are aﬀected
by the legislation in countries with job security provisions and by the lack
of the turnover data for most countries of the sample. We use a benchmark
turnover rate from the United States, a country with lower job security
costs than any country in our LAC sample. Evidence on turnover rates for
Latin America is scant. However, evidence for a few countries for which
job reallocation rates can be computed suggest that turnover rates in Latin
America are within the ranges observed in the United States and other de-
veloped countries (Inter-American Development Bank [IADB] 2004). The
choice of this benchmark is clearly a rough way to avoid endogeneity prob-
lems. To assign values to the discounted future payments of advance no-
tice, indemnities and seniority pay, we use the information contained in
tables A.1 and A.2 in appendix A. When regulations mandate diﬀerent
provisions for white-collar and blue-collar workers, we take the unweighted
average for the two types of workers.
By construction, our job security measures give a higher weight to dis-
missal costs that may arise soon after a worker is hired because they are dis-
counted less at the time of hiring, while they discount more ﬁring costs that
arise further in the future. Our measure captures the expected average cost.
Consequently, it does not measure the true marginal labor cost, which is
state contingent, nor does it distinguish dynamic from static costs, as we
have previously noted. We discuss these issues further in appendix B.
Quantifying the Cost of Social Security
To quantify the cost of social security regulations and payroll taxation,
we gather data on mandatory payroll contributions to old age, disability
and death, sickness and maternity, work injury, unemployment insurance,
and family allowances programs. Because the nominal incidence of the
contributions (whether they fall on the employer or the employee) is irrel-
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12. In two countries, the law mandates seniority pay, but this is not capitalized in individ-
ual savings accounts. See appendix A for a description of this case.evant in measuring total social cost (although it is not irrelevant for the
study of labor demand), we add both contributions as a percentage of
wages. To quantify the cost of social security provisions in a way that is
comparable to the cost of job security, we compute the expected cost of so-
cial security provisions (SSP) at the time of hiring as








j,t iare, respectively, the costs of payroll taxes paid by the
employer and the worker expressed as a percent of wages, and   is the dis-
count rate.13
I.3.7 The Cost of Labor Laws across Countries
Table 3summarizes our measures of the cost associated with diﬀerent la-
bor regulation regimes. In the ﬁrst three columns, we summarize the cost
of abiding by employment protection laws at the end of the 1990s. We gen-
erate these indices for all countries in all years for which we have data.
Table 3 only reports those values for the last year of our sample. Column
(1) summarizes the cost of giving advance notice to workers. In the Latin
American countries, the typical required advance notice is a month or the
equivalent to 0.63 monthly wages in expected value terms. Bolivia stands
out as the country that requires one of the longer advance notice periods
(1.77 months in expected terms), while Peru and Uruguay require no ad-
vance notice. Mandatory advance notice provisions tend to be more strin-
gent in OECD countries. Many OECD countries mandate fairly long ad-
vance notice periods, particularly for skilled workers. In addition, in most
countries, advance notice periods increase with seniority. In Belgium, for
instance, the mandatory advance notice for skilled workers with ten years
of seniority is nine months, while for workers with twenty years of senior-
ity it is ﬁfteen months. In Sweden, all workers with ten years of seniority
are entitled to an advance notice period of ﬁve months, whereas for a
worker with twenty years of seniority, the mandatory advance notice pe-
riod is six months. The fact that Belgium and Sweden have very similar val-
ues in table 3 reﬂects the fact that in Belgium very high advance notice only
applies to skilled workers, whereas in Sweden it applies to all workers. It
also reﬂects the fact that our measure heavily discounts costs that are ex-
pected to occur far in the future. On average, mandated advance notice pe-
riods are signiﬁcantly longer in OECD countries than in the LAC sample.
The second column displays the cost of indemnities for dismissal. Within
the LAC sample, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, El Salvador, and
28 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagés
13. We obtain the information on these contributions from the series Social Security Pro-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Honduras stand out as countries where the cost of abiding by these regu-
lations is the highest. In the sample of OECD countries, Portugal, Turkey,
Korea, Italy, and Spain are the ones where indemnities for dismissal laws
are more costly (in terms of expected monthly wages), while a number of
countries, including Belgium, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States do not mandate indemnities for dismissal. Comparing the two re-
gional samples, it is clear that, on average, compensation for dismissal is
three times larger in LAC than in the OECD countries, despite the much
lower level of income in the LAC region.
The third column refers to seniority pay. This additional payment is man-
datory in only six Latin American countries, but the estimated expected
discounted costs are large when this feature is present. In Colombia, Brazil,
Ecuador, and Peru, employers are required to deposit about one month
of pay every year to workers’ individual savings accounts. Over the life of a
worker, this provision is expected to cost about ten monthly wages in these
four countries. Once advance notice, compensation for dismissal, and sev-
erance pay are added, we ﬁnd that the cost of job security provisions is
much higher in the poorer LAC region than in the richer OECD sample.
The fourth column reports the expected costs of complying with social
security laws. Compared to the costs of employment security, social secu-
rity costs are very large and therefore constitute the lion’s share of the total
costs of labor laws. In Argentina, for example, expected discounted costs
of social security are 44.5 months of pay, while in many OECD countries
these costs are even larger. In the average Latin American country, social
security payments amount to 82 percent of the total costs of labor laws.
This percentage is even larger in OECD countries where, on average, they
reach 96 percent of the total regulatory costs.
Once all the costs are aggregated, labor laws impose a much larger cost
in OECD countries. However, the composition of these costs is quite diﬀer-
ent. While the typical Latin American country mandates shorter advance
notice periods and lower social security contributions than the average
OECD country, job security provisions are substantially higher in LAC.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have a higher burden of regu-
lations that aﬀect adjustment processes in the labor market. European
countries have a higher burden of payroll taxation that aﬀects labor de-
mand but not labor adjustment. Both regions have a much higher burden
of labor costs than North America.
Exploring the relationship between income per capita and social protec-
tion across countries, it is clear that job security provisions are strategies
of low-income regions. Figure 4 graphs regression relationships for each
ofour measures of labor cost on GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) and GDP
squared. Across countries, advance notice costs tend to increase with in-
come; seniority pay and indemnities for dismissal decline with country in-
Introduction 31come. Social security contributions follow an inverted U-shape pattern in
income. They tend to increase with income in the Latin American sample
and reach a maximum in medium-income countries, while they tend to de-
cline with income within the sample of upper-income countries. Regula-
tion is an inferior good. It is the response of poor countries to the demand
for worker security. By imposing a mandate on ﬁrms, central governments
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Fig. 4 Labor regulations and GDP per capita
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on labor force statistics, OECD; World Bank (2000);
and Ministries of Labor in Latin America and the Caribbean.avoid the direct ﬁscal cost of ﬁnancing social safety nets, albeit at the cost
of aﬀecting their labor market performance.
We next examine the evolution of these measures over time. Since the
early 1980s there have been few reforms in job security provisions in Latin
America and even fewer in OECD countries. Social security contributions
have changed more, but even they seldom change drastically. This lack of
variability, particularly in job security provisions, poses a challenge for em-
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Fig. 4 (cont.)pirical studies of the impact of regulations. Figure 5shows the level and the
changes in job security since the late 1980s across Latin American coun-
tries. The general view that there have been important reductions in dis-
missal costs in Latin America is not accurate once we aggregate across all
components of job security. Only Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Venezu-
ela have experienced a reduction in the costs of terminating indeﬁnite con-
tracts. In Venezuela and Panama, the reduction in indemnities has been
partly oﬀset by increases in the costs of severance pay. Our measures reveal
that Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Nicaragua undertook re-
forms that increased the cost of dismissal. Assembling Latin American and
OECD events, there are thirteen episodes in which job security provisions
were changed. Nine of these episodes occurred in Latin America, and four
occurred in the OECD sample. Figure 6 shows the percentage change in
advance notice and indemnities for dismissal in the countries that have ex-
perienced reforms. It makes clear that changes in job security costs have
been substantial in Latin America relative to the OECD sample. The enor-
mous variation in the Latin American region and the exogeneity of some
of the reforms is the reason why we think that the study of Latin American
labor markets can inform further analyses of the impacts of regulation in
economies around the world.
Figure 7reports social security contributions (measured in expected dis-
counted cost terms) at the beginning and at the end of the 1990s for Latin
American countries. There have been important changes during the last
decade. In many countries, social security contributions increased during
the 1990s as a consequence of pension reforms and population aging. Yet,
in some countries, most signiﬁcantly in Argentina, social security contri-
butions were reduced during the decade.
I.3.8 Enforcement and Informality
The measures summarized in table 3calculate de jure cost of regulations,
assuming that ﬁrms and workers abide by the text of the law. In practice,
however, enforcement is at best weak, and many workers end up not being
covered by mandatory regulations. Such workers are often referred to as
informal workers. Given the diﬃculties in measuring the extent of infor-
mality, diﬀerent approaches have been followed in the literature. Some au-
thors follow the traditional ILO approach of classifying as informal those
workers who are either self-employed, work for ﬁrms with ﬁve or less em-
ployees, work as unpaid family help, or are employed as domestic workers.
Although some of these workers may be receiving the beneﬁts prescribed
by the law, there tends to be a high correlation between being in any of these
categories of employment and not being covered by labor laws. Other au-
thors use a more direct measure of informality, computing the percentage
of workers who are aﬃliated with social security programs or have a for-
mal labor contract. All authors in this volume use a “beneﬁts” deﬁnition of













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 4 Estimates of Long-Run Constant-Output Labor Demand Elasticity
Study Data Description Wage Elasticity
A. Latin America
Mondino and Montoya  Panel of establishments;  No capital; instruments  [–.353, –.94]
(chap. 6 in this volume) manufacturing; 1990–1996;  for output and wages; from 
quarterly; Argentina dynamic labor demand
Saavedra and Torero  Panel of establishments;  No capital; instruments for  –.19
(chap. 2 in this volume) ﬁrms with more than 10  output; Labor costs in-
workers; 1986–1996;  cludes legislative costs; sta-
bimonthly; Peru tic labor demand
Fajnzylber and Maloney  Panel of establishments; 










Roberts and Skouﬁas  Panel of manufacturing 
(1997) data; 1981–1987; Colombia
Skilled –0.42
Unskilled –0.65
Cassoni, Allen, and  2-digit manufacturing;  No capital; system of 
Labadie (chap. 8 in this  1975–1997; Uruguay equations
volume) 1975–1984 –0.69
1985–1997 –0.22
Cárdenas and Bernal  Panel of 92 manufacturing  No capital; dynamic labor  –1.43
(chap. 4 in this volume) sectors 4 digit CIIU;  demand
1978–1995
B. Rest of the World
Waud (1968) 2-digit manufacturing;  Capital –1.03
1954–1964; quarterly; U.S.
De Pelsmacker (1984) 5 auto manufacturing ﬁrms;  Capital, labor prices, pro- –0.44
1976–1982; Belgium duction workers
Field and Grebenstein  10 2-digit manufacturing  Capital and energy prices  –0.51
(1980) industry; 1971; U.S. included




Wylie (1990) Four 2-digit manufacturing; –0.52
annual; 1900–1929; U.S.informality, except for the study by Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (chap. 1
in this volume), which follows the ILO convention.
Measured by the extent of compliance with social security regulations in
Latin America, noncompliance is substantial. According to IADB (2004),
only 42.7 percent of all workers and 60 percent of all wage employees are
contributing to such programs (see table 2). Among the countries covered
in the individual studies of this volume, compliance as percentage of total
employment is the highest in Chile and Uruguay and the lowest in Peru.
Compliance tends to be higher among skilled workers, among workers em-
ployed in larger ﬁrms, and in the manufacturing and high-paying ﬁnance
and business services sectors. In these latter sectors, the eﬀect of regula-
tions should be easier to detect. Compliance is higher when the burden of
regulation is lower.
I.4 The Impact of Labor Market Regulations
This section summarizes the studies of the impact of labor market regu-
lations that are presented in this volume and places them in the context of
the literature on more economically developed countries. We distinguish
between policies that alter employment levels (generating static costs) from
policies that aﬀect employment ﬂows (generating dynamic transition
costs). The essays contained in this book present evidence on both types of
policies. We also report ﬁndings on the eﬀects of temporary contracts and
minimum wages.
I.4.1 A Static Labor Demand-Labor Supply Analysis
A convenient starting point from which to assess the impact of labor
market regulations on employment levels is the standard neoclassical la-
bor demand-labor supply framework. If mandatory legislation increases
labor costs, economic theory predicts that a move up the labor demand
function produces a fall in employment. The slope of the labor demand
schedule provides a good measure of the policy-induced change in em-
ployment when governments or trade unions set labor costs administra-
tively. The standard theory is silent about the eﬀects of the regulation on
unemployment because it depends on whether the displaced workers drop
out of the labor force or attempt to seek new jobs.
Table 4 summarizes estimates of constant-output labor demand elastic-
ities for Latin America. As noted by Hamermesh (chap. 11 in this volume),
these estimates are comparable to those estimated for other countries.14Al-
Introduction 39
14. A more comprehensive measure of the impact of regulations on employment is given by
the total elasticity, which includes the possible scale eﬀects of an increase in regulation in-
cluding the entry and exit of ﬁrms due to changes in labor costs. Unfortunately, there is very
little empirical evidence in this book regarding the magnitude of the total elasticity, although
studies by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) suggest that
entry and exit decisions are an important component of the response to regulation.though labor demand studies abound, we focus on those studies that use
disaggregated industry or individual ﬁrm data to infer the labor demand
parameters, because models ﬁt on such data produces more reliable esti-
mates of underlying production parameters than models ﬁt on data at
higher levels of aggregation (Hamermesh 1993). Comparisons across types
of workers indicate that labor demand elasticities are larger for blue-collar
than for white-collar workers, suggesting a lower impact of regulations on
the employment rates of the latter. Estimates of labor demand for Latin
America tend to be somewhat lower than those obtained for other coun-
tries of the world, especially those estimated for Peru and Mexico. (See the
estimates from industrial countries in the lower panel of the table.) None-
theless, all estimates are between 0 and –1.5, and most of them cluster
between –0.2 and –0.6, well within the range for worldwide estimates re-
ported by Hamermesh (1993) for output-constant labor demand elastici-
ties.15 This range of estimates implies that a 10 percent increase in labor
costs will result in a sizable decline in employment, between 2 percent and
6 percent.
The preceding analysis assumes that the cost of regulations is entirely
paid by employers. However, when the supply of labor is not perfectly elas-
tic, part of the increase in labor costs will be compensated by lower wages,
reducing the disemployment eﬀect of the regulations. Alternatively, work-
ers may not perceive the cost of regulation as a tax, because higher contri-
butions pay for improved job beneﬁts, which are valued. In this case, work-
ers will be willing to pay for this beneﬁt, reducing their wage demands. This
wage oﬀset would also contribute to lessening the impact of regulations on
employment.
How likely is it that the costs of labor market regulations are shifted to
workers in Latin America? Before reviewing the existing evidence, it is im-
portant to note important features of Latin American labor markets. First,
high evasion implies that the relevant labor supply to the formal sector in
developing countries is likely to be more elastic than in developed ones.
Thus, if workers have access to similar jobs in both the formal and infor-
mal sectors, the possibilities of shifting costs to workers are lessened, re-
sulting in a high elasticity of labor supply to formal-sector ﬁrms that
comply with regulations. Second, as previously noted, in some countries
minimum wages are quite high, both absolutely and in relation to the aver-
age wage, and this reduces the scope for wage shifts (see ﬁgure 2). More-
over, Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (chap. 1 in this volume) show piling up
of workers at minimum wage levels, suggesting that compliance with the
minimum wage is substantial even in the so-called “informal” sectors so
that wage shifting will be attenuated in countries with a binding minimum
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15. Hamermesh (1993) reports a range between –0.15 and –0.75 and an average estimate of
–0.45.wage that also aﬀects the informal sector. Third, although most social se-
curity programs in the region are restricted to covered workers, and this
tightens the link between contributions and beneﬁts, the dismal ﬁnancial
condition of some social security systems and the high degree of discretion
exercised by governments over the determination of beneﬁts weaken this
link. In this respect, the recent social security reforms aimed at privatizing
pensions should strengthen the relationship between beneﬁts and costs in
many countries of the region.
Several empirical studies have attempted to measure the impact of man-
datory beneﬁts on employment rates. Gruber (1994) analyzes the eﬀects
of insurance for workplace injuries and mandated maternity beneﬁts in
theUnited States and ﬁnds that a large share of the cost is shifted to wages,
with only minor disemployment eﬀects. In contrast, Kaestner (1996) ex-
amines the eﬀect of unemployment insurance contributions on the employ-
ment of U.S. youth and ﬁnds large disemployment eﬀects and little wage
shifting.
For developing countries, there is some evidence on the magnitude of
wage shifts predating the studies collected in this volume. MacIsaac and
Rama (1997) assess the fungibility of the cost of mandated beneﬁts in
Ecuador. In 1994, the year they study, Ecuador had one of the most cum-
bersome labor legislation regimes in Latin America. Beyond mandated
contributions to social security programs, the law also mandated payment
of thirteen-, fourteen-, ﬁfteen-, and sixteen-month payments for separa-
tion at various times of the same year. MacIsaac and Rama’s analysis sug-
gests that while labor market regulations increase labor costs, part of the
increase is shifted to workers in the form of lower base wages. Thus, for an
average Ecuadorian worker, social security contributions and other man-
dated beneﬁts amount to a large share of the base wage. However, workers
whose employers comply with regulations earn on average only 18 percent
more than workers at noncompliant ﬁrms. This diﬀerence is explained by
a 39 percent reduction in the base earnings of workers in compliant ﬁrms.
Interestingly, these reductions are not uniform across ﬁrms; they are
smaller in larger ﬁrms and essentially zero in the public sector and in
unionized ﬁrms.
Mondino and Montoya (chap. 6 in this volume) and Edwards and Cox-
Edwards (1999) explore this topic for Argentina and Chile, respectively, by
comparing wages of workers who have access to social security programs
with wages of uncovered workers. In Argentina, Mondino and Montoya
(chap. 6 in this volume) ﬁnd that during the period 1975–1996, wages of
noncovered workers were 8 percent higher than the wages of covered work-
ers. Considering that employee-paid payroll contributions average 40 per-
cent of the payroll, the share of contributions paid by workers is around 20
percent of total labor costs. In Chile, Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1999)
ﬁnd evidence of a larger wage shift. In 1994, cash wages for workers cov-
Introduction 41ered by mandatory pension, health, and life insurance were 14 percent
lower than wages for noncovered workers. Since, in that year, social secu-
rity contributions amounted to 20 percent of wages and were nominally
paid by workers, their estimates suggest that about 70 percent of the cost
of social security contributions were absorbed by workers, while the other
30 percent fell on employers. Gruber (1997) reports evidence of an even
larger wage shift in the aftermath of the 1981 pension reform in Chile. The
1981 reform reduced employer-paid labor taxes and increased taxes paid
by employees. In addition, the funding of some programs was shifted to
general revenue. Using this tax change as a “natural experiment” and data
on individual ﬁrms’ payments in labor taxes and wages, he seeks to deter-
mine whether lower employer-paid labor taxes are associated with higher
wages within a ﬁrm. His results suggest a full shift of payroll taxes to wages
and no eﬀect on employment.16
Marrufo (2001) examines the 1997 reform in Mexico, which, as in Chile,
transformed the pay-as-you-go pension system into an individual retire-
ment accounts (IRA) system. She ﬁnds evidence of substantial employ-
ment reallocation between noncovered and covered sectors, suggesting
that the labor supply to covered sectors is fairly elastic. However, she also
ﬁnds evidence of a wage shift in response to a reform that ties beneﬁts to
taxes collected. Decomposing the eﬀect of the reforms into the eﬀect of a
tax reduction and the eﬀect of tying beneﬁts to contributions, she ﬁnds that
increasing social security taxes reduces wages by 43 percent of the tax in-
crease, while increasing beneﬁts decreases wages by 57 percent of the value
of beneﬁts.
An important factor determining the extent of wage pass-through is
whether minimum wages bind. Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (chap. 1 in
this volume) document that the minimum wage binds in Colombia. This
explains the weak pass-through eﬀects reported by Cárdenas and Bernal
(chap. 4 in this volume) for Colombia. At the same time, the minimum
wage is less binding, and pass-through eﬀects may be more substantial in
Mexico and Chile, and this may explain the Marrufo (2001) and Gruber
(1997) results.
All in all, the available evidence suggests that at least part of the cost of
42 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagés
16. Measuring the impact of such an “experiment” is complicated by many factors. (See the
discussion in Edwards and Cox-Edwards 2000.) First, although payroll taxes declined, worker
contributions increased. If measured wage payments by ﬁrms include employee contribu-
tions, then a decline in employer-paid taxes will be associated with higher measured wages
due to higher employee-paid contributions. Second, measurement error in wages biases his
estimates toward ﬁnding full shifting, as he reports. The quality of his instruments is ques-
tionable, and he is forced to make strong assumptions to circumvent a severe measurement
error problem. Third, at a time when social security reform made work beneﬁts more attrac-
tive, he estimates that wages were rising. The only way that wages can rise to match the de-
creased employer taxes in an environment with an improved link between employee contri-
butions and beneﬁts is if labor supply is perfectly inelastic to covered sector ﬁrms, which
seems implausible.nonwage beneﬁts is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages, and,
therefore, the employment cost of such programs will be lower than what
is predicted by the elasticity of the labor demand. Combining wage-shift
and labor demand estimates indicates that a 10 percent increase in non-
wage labor costs can lead to a decline in employment rates ranging between
0.6 and 4.8 percent, with most of the evidence shaded toward the high end
of this spectrum.
Given the signiﬁcance of these estimates for policy decisions, it is im-
portant to estimate them as accurately as possible. In this regard, the room
for improvement in the literature is still large. As they stand, they might
overestimate or underestimate the true employment impact depending on
which of the following two eﬀects dominates. On the one hand, the re-
ported estimates are based on constant-output labor demand elasticities,
which do not consider the employment eﬀects of regulations through a
negative eﬀect on the scale of production of existing ﬁrms and on entry and
exit decisions of ﬁrms. From this perspective, the reported range of esti-
mates provides a lower bound on the disemployment eﬀects of regulation.
Moreover, the estimates of the wage shift in MacIsaac and Rama (1997),
Mondino and Montoya (chap. 6 in this volume), and Edwards and Cox-
Edwards (1999) only include the cost of social security programs, but do
not include the cost of other regulations such as job security or vacation
time. Once the cost of these regulations is taken into account, the com-
puted wage shift could be lower than what we report above, and, therefore,
the estimated eﬀects of those costs on employment would be larger.
On the other hand, studies comparing wages of covered and noncovered
workers performed using a cross-section of workers, such as most of the
ones discussed above, may underestimate wage shifts and overestimate em-
ployment costs. It is necessary to model selection into covered sectors. This
is because unobserved personal characteristics correlated with social secu-
rity aﬃliation might explain higher wages in covered sectors.17 If this cor-
relation is substantial, it will lead to an underestimation of wage diﬀer-
ences between covered and uncovered workers, and hence reduce estimates
of the fraction of wage costs shifted to workers. This concern highlights the
importance of the Marrufo (2001) study because she controls for sectoral
self-selection bias and still ﬁnds substantial evidence of wage shifting. If
her selection adjustments to the Mexican data are typical of what would be
found in other Latin American countries, the weight of the evidence in this
book and the literature on ﬁrm entry in response to incentives suggest that
the studies reported in this volume underestimate the disemployment
eﬀects of regulation.
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17. For instance, if workers covered by social security programs also happen to be more
productive, then they will also have higher wages. Yet, higher wages are explained by unob-
served productivity and not by social security aﬃliation.I.4.2 Job Security Provisions Alter Hiring and Firing Decisions
Regulations aﬀecting transition costs are not adequately analyzed
within a simple static labor demand–labor supply framework. Dismissal
costs and other regulations not only increase labor costs, but also alter
ﬁrms’ ﬁring and hiring decisions. The importance of dismissal costs in
Latin America is clearly shown in ﬁgure 5. Where nonwage labor costs are
low relative to those of OECD countries, dismissal costs tend to be very
high. These costs make Latin American labor markets less ﬂexible than
OECD markets and likely impair productivity and adaptation to new tech-
nology and trade patterns as they do in Europe (see Heckman 2003). It is
thus important to assess the impact, if any, that such policies have on the
functioning of the labor market.
Theoretical Discussion
To  analyze the full impact of job security provisions requires a more
complex framework that encompasses dynamic decisions of ﬁrms. Bertola
(1990) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990) develop dynamic partial-
equilibrium models to assess how a ﬁrm’s ﬁring and hiring decisions are
aﬀected by dismissal costs. In the face of a given shock, the optimal em-
ployment policy of a ﬁrm involves one of three state-contingent responses:
(1) dismissing workers, (2) hiring workers, or (3) doing nothing. Appendix
B presents a simple two-period model of labor adjustment that summa-
rizes the main ideas in this literature.
In the face of a negative shock and declining marginal value of labor, a
ﬁrm might want to dismiss some workers. However, it faces a dismissal cost
in most regulatory regimes in LAC. This cost has the eﬀect of discouraging
ﬁrms from adjusting their labor force, resulting in fewer dismissals than the
number of dismissals that would occur in a scenario in the absence of such
costs. Conversely, in the face of a positive shock, ﬁrms might want to hire ad-
ditional workers but would take into account that it would be costly for
some workers to be ﬁred if future demand declined. This potential cost acts
as a hiring cost, eﬀectively reducing the creation of new jobs in a relatively
healthy economy. The net result is lower employment rates in expansions,
higher employment rates in recessions, and lower turnover rates as ﬁrms hire
and ﬁre fewer workers than they would in the absence of adjustment costs.
Adjustment costs produce a decline in employment variability associ-
ated with ﬁring costs. The implication of these models for average employ-
ment is ambiguous. In particular, whether average employment rates in-
crease or decline as a result of ﬁring costs depends on whether over the
cycle the decline in hiring rates more than compensates for the reduction
in dismissals. Simulations reported in Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) suggest that average employment in a given ﬁrm is likely to
increase when ﬁring costs increase. However, these results are quite sensi-
44 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagéstive to diﬀerent assumptions about the persistence of shocks, the elasticity
of the labor demand, the magnitude of the discount rate, and the func-
tional form of the production function. Less persistent shocks and lower
discount rates produce larger negative eﬀects of job security on employ-
ment because both factors reduce hiring relative to ﬁring (Bentolila and
Saint-Paul 1994; Bertola, 1992). Furthermore, a higher elasticity of the de-
mand for goods implies a larger negative eﬀect of job security on employ-
ment rates. In addition, when investment decisions are also considered, ﬁr-
ing costs lower proﬁts and discourage investment, increasing the likelihood
that they reduce the demand for labor (Risager and Sorensen 1997).
The Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990) analyses focus on
employment rates in a “representative” ﬁrm without considering the im-
pact of ﬁring costs on the extensive margin, that is, on how ﬁring costs
aﬀect the creation and destruction of ﬁrms. Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) develop a general equilibrium model based on the U.S. economy.
The partial equilibrium framework of Bertola (1990) is embedded in their
model as part of a general equilibrium framework in which jobs and ﬁrms
are created and destroyed in every period in response to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks. In the context of their model, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
ﬁnd that increasing ﬁring costs in the United States would lead to an in-
crease in the average employment of existing ﬁrms as a consequence of the
reduction in ﬁrings. However, they also ﬁnd that such a policy would result
in lower ﬁrm entry and lower job creation in newly created ﬁrms. These ﬁ-
nal two eﬀects could potentially oﬀset the increase in employment in exist-
ing ﬁrms, and they would thus reduce overall employment rates.
The recent literature has also emphasized the possible impact of job se-
curity regulations on the composition of employment. Kugler (chap. 3 in
this volume) proposes a model in which job security regulations provide in-
centives for high turnover ﬁrms to operate in the informal sector. This de-
cision would entail producing at a small, less eﬃcient scale in order to re-
main inconspicuous to tax and labor authorities. In this framework, high
job security costs paid by formal sector ﬁrms would likely increase infor-
mality rates. Pagés and Montenegro (1999) develop a model in which job
security provisions, which depend on tenure, bias employment against
young workers in favor of older ones. As severance pay increases with
tenure, and tenure tends to increase with age, older workers become more
costly to dismiss than younger ones. If wages do not adjust appropriately,
negative shocks result in a disproportionate share of layoﬀs among young
workers. Therefore, job security based on tenure results in lower employ-
ment rates for the young, relative to older, workers because it reduces hir-
ing and increases layoﬀs for young workers. This eﬀect has also been found
in studies of European employment (Heckman 2003).
Finally, it is important to understand that not all components of dis-
missal costs may have the same eﬀect on employment and unemployment
Introduction 45rates. Thus, in principle, there is an important conceptual distinction be-
tween advance notice and indemnities, which are state contingent and
aﬀect the cost of adjustment to diﬀerent states, and seniority pay provi-
sions, which are paid in all states and do not aﬀect transitions. The latter
are more comparable to other nonwage costs such as vacation and other
mandatory beneﬁts.
The existing evidence regarding the impact of employment protection is
abundant but inconclusive. Table 5from Addison and Teixeira (2001) sum-
marizes the current literature. While Addison and Grosso (1996), Grubb
and Wells (1993), Lazear (1990), Heckman and Pagés (2000), Nickell
(1997), and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001) ﬁnd a negative relationship be-
tween job security provisions and employment, other studies, such as Ad-
dison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000), (Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development [OECD] 1999), Garibaldi and Mauro (1999), and
Freeman (2002) do not ﬁnd evidence of such a relationship. The evidence
on the eﬀects of job security on unemployment is equally ambiguous.
Some studies ﬁnd a positive link between job security and unemployment
(Addison and Grosso 1996; Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta 1998; Lazear
1990), while others ﬁnd no eﬀect (Blanchard 1998; Heckman and Pagés
2000; Nickell 1997). Our own estimates at the end of this chapter give rea-
sons for these mixed ﬁndings. All these studies are based on the analysis of
aggregates of cross-country time series data with little variation in regula-
tory policies. The studies presented in this volume surmount some of these
diﬃculties by studying episodes of major labor reform using large micro-
data sets. Using disaggregated data for single countries, Mondino and
Montoya (chap. 6 in this volume) and Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in this
volume) ﬁnd a large negative relationship between employment protection
and employment. The studies presented in this volume contribute sub-
stantially to a literature that analyzes the consequences of reforms. Recent
studies for OECD countries using disaggregated data suggest a negative
eﬀect of job security regulations on employment. Autor, Donohue, and
Schwab (2003) estimate the eﬀects of recent common law wrongful dis-
charge doctrines adopted by courts across states in the United States that
limit employment at will. They ﬁnd that the wrongful discharge doctrine
has a negative impact on employment to population rates in state labor
markets. Similarly, Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002) ﬁnd that in Spain
a combination of a reduction in payroll taxes and the reduction of dismis-
sal costs increased the employment of workers on permanent contracts.
Finally, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and the earlier work of Deleire
(2000), examine the eﬀects of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
which outlaws discrimination against the disabled in hiring, ﬁring, and pay
on the employment rate of workers with disabilities. The Acemoglu and
Angrist ﬁndings and prior work by Deleire (2000) suggest that the passage
of the act reduced employment for disabled workers.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Empirical Evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean
The essays assembled in this volume assess the impact of job security
regulation on employment and turnover rates in LAC and provide the ﬁrst
systematic evidence of its impact on the labor market. Several studies as-
sess the impact of job security on turnover rates in the labor market.
Changes in turnover are measured using changes in the duration of jobs
(tenure), the duration of unemployment, and rates of exiting out of em-
ployment and unemployment.18 Higher employment exit rates indicate
more layoﬀs (or more quits), while higher exit rates out of unemployment
and into formal jobs indicate higher job creation in the formal sector.
Other studies examine the impact of job security on employment rates. The
deﬁnition of employment used in the empirical studies varies, depending
on the country being analyzed. In general, most studies focus on employ-
ment in large ﬁrms, although some also examine more aggregated mea-
sures of employment. In addition, a small group of studies also examine
the impact of job security on the composition of employment. See table 6
for an overview of the empirical evidence for LAC presented in this vol-
ume.
Turnover Rates
As predicted by most theoretical models, the bulk of empirical evidence
reported in this volume conﬁrms that less-stringent job security tends to be
associated with higher turnover and greater ﬂexibility in the labor market.
Kugler (chap. 3 in this volume) analyzes the impact of the 1990 labor mar-
ket reforms in Colombia. She ﬁnds that a reduction in job security costs re-
duces average tenure and increases employment exit rates.19 This decline is
signiﬁcantly larger in the formal sector, which is covered by the regulations,
than in the uncovered or informal sector. In addition, the increase is greater
in large ﬁrms than in the small ones. Her results show similar patterns
within tradable and nontradable sectors, providing a clear indication that
the decline in tenure cannot be attributed to contemporary trade reforms.
The increasing use of temporary contracts explains only part of the in-
crease in formal turnover rates because job stability also declined for work-
ers employed at permanent jobs.20
Kugler also ﬁnds a decline in the average duration of unemployment
Introduction 57
18. These studies estimate hazard rates. The hazard rate is deﬁned as the rate at which a
given spell of employment or unemployment ends in a given period conditional on having
lasted a given period of time in the spell (e.g., one month, one year).
19. In this study tenure is measured by the duration of incomplete employment spells.
20. In her study, Kugler performs two types of analyses. First, she uses a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator to analyze whether changes in average duration of employment (unem-
ployment) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the formal and informal sectors. Second, she estimates
an exponential duration model to control for changes in demographic covariates, pooling
data from before and after the reform and using interaction terms to assess the diﬀerential im-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.after the reforms. In addition, exit rates out of unemployment increase
more for workers who leave unemployment by going into the formal sector
than they do for those who exit into informal jobs. As with average tenure,
her results show quite similar patterns across sectors and a higher exit rate
toward larger ﬁrms. Finally, only two-thirds of the increase in the rate of
entry into unemployment can be attributed to higher use of temporary
contracts. The rest is explained by increased exit rates into permanent jobs
in the formal sector.
Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in this volume) conduct a similar study,
evaluating the impact of the 1991 reform in Peru. Like the reform in
Colombia, the 1991 Peruvian reform considerably reduced the cost of dis-
missing workers. Their analysis shows a consistent decline in average ten-
ure from 1991 onward, suggesting higher exit rates from employment. As
in the Kugler study, the decline is signiﬁcantly more pronounced in the
formal sector than it is in the informal sector. In addition, the tenure pat-
terns were quite similar across economic sectors, suggesting that these ﬁnd-
ings cannot be explained by the trade reforms that took place in the early
1990s.
In contrast to these ﬁndings, Barros and Corseuil (chap. 5 in this volume)
ﬁnd little evidence that the substantial 1988 Brazilian Constitutional re-
form altered employment exit rates. In that year, the cost of dismissing
workers was raised, and, therefore, a reduction in exit rates would be ex-
pected as a result. (Many other reforms were also put in place as well.)
Their results indicate that aggregate employment exit rates decline in the
formal sector relative to the informal sector for short employment spells
(two years or less), but increase for longer spells. Their measured increase
in exit rates for long spells could be driven by the special characteristics of
the Brazilian system. In this system, employers contribute 8 percent of a
worker’s wage to the worker’s individual account. In case of involuntary
dismissal, the worker can claim the principal, the compounded interest
rate, and a penalty paid by the ﬁrm, which in the 1988 reform was raised
from 10 percent to 40 percent of principal plus interest. In the case of a vol-
untary quit, the worker receives nothing. This asymmetry in the treatment
of termination induces workers to force dismissal or to collude with ﬁrms
to obtain the funds accumulated in the account. It can be argued that the
1988 reform greatly increased the incentives to force dismissals, particu-
larly for workers with longer tenures. This may explain the increase in exit
rates for workers with longer employment spells.
These three studies use the informal sector as a control group unaﬀected
by the reforms. Their credibility hinges on the validity of this assumption.
Kugler shows that estimates based on formal-informal sector comparisons
are likely to be biased. However, such comparisons are still valid under cer-
tain conditions—at least as tests of the null hypothesis of no eﬀect of the
60 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagésreform.21 When viewed as a whole, these studies provide evidence that dis-
missal costs and other employment protection mechanisms reduce worker
reallocation in the labor market. Unfortunately, these studies do not iden-
tify whether reduced worker reallocation is due to reduced layoﬀs, lower
quits, or a mix of both.
Some studies in this book assess the impact of regulations on the speed
of adjustment using the length of the lag (the speed of adjustment) as an al-
ternative measure of the constraints faced by ﬁrms. The intuition support-
ing this is based on the original work of Holt et al. (1960).
Let nt ∗ be the optimal level of employment at date t determined by some
implicit (usually static) theory. Let the cost of being out of equilibrium, ct
0, be
quadratic in deviations of current employment from optimal employment:
(2) ct
0    0(nt ∗   nt)2  0   0
The greater the discrepancy between employment at t and optimal em-
ployment, the greater the cost. There is also a cost of adjustment, ct
a, which
is also assumed to be quadratic in the adjustment from nt–1 to nt:
(3) ct
a    a(nt   nt 1)2
Minimizing the sum of these costs produces an optimal labor demand nt:
nt   (1    )nt ∗    nt 1,
where
   




The greater the cost of adjustment, the bigger the value of  . Abraham and
Houseman (1993) and many others use this method to assess the eﬀect of
diﬀerent regulatory regimes across countries on adjustment costs, while
others interact   with measures of regulations to assess whether the speed
of adjustment increases or declines when the regulatory environment is
changed. Cárdenas and Bernal (chap. 4 in this volume), Barros and Cor-
seuil (chap. 5 in this volume) and Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in this vol-
ume) use this methodology to examine whether the speed of adjustment
increased or declined after labor reforms. In the study of Saavedra and
Torero, their estimated interaction term suggests that more stringent regu-
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21. Kugler shows that lower severance pay may induce high-turnover informal ﬁrms to
move to the formal sector. Assuming either no overlap in the distribution of turnover between
covered and uncovered ﬁrms or that entry to the covered sector comes from the high-end—
or at least from the end that is higher than the formal sector—this shift results in higher
turnover in both the formal and the informal sector. Higher turnover in the informal sector
biases the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator downward. Therefore, a positive estimate still
provides substantial evidence of increased turnover in the formal sector.lations reduce the speed of adjustment, particularly in the prereform pe-
riod, when regulation was very stringent. In the other two studies, this
methodology is unable to identify any changes in adjustment due to re-
forms. This is particularly relevant in the study of Cárdenas and Bernal on
Colombia because other methodologies based on duration data (Kugler,
chap. 3 in this volume) show clear eﬀects of regulation on adjustment. Ad-
dison and Teixeira (2001) indicate that “none of the implementations of
this (adjustment cost) model in core OECD countries were able to detect a
discernible impact of job security regulations on the speed of employment
adjustment.” In the concluding section of this paper, we discuss why the lag
coeﬃcient is not a reliable measure of the regulatory costs, especially when
applied to cross-country data.
Average Employment
The available evidence for LAC countries shows a consistent, although
not always statistically signiﬁcant, negative impact of job security provi-
sions on average employment rates. Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in this
volume) and Mondino and Montoya (chap. 6 in this volume) use ﬁrm-level
panel data to estimate the impact of job security on employment in Peru
and Argentina, respectively. Both studies estimate labor demand equations
in which an explicit measure of job security appears on the right-hand side
of the equation, and both ﬁnd evidence that higher job security levels are
associated with lower employment rates.22 In the case of Peru, Saavedra
and Torero ﬁnd that the size of the impact of regulations is correlated with
the magnitude of the regulations themselves. Thus, the impact is very high
at the beginning of their sample (1987–1990), coinciding with a period of
very high dismissal costs (see their table 4). Afterward, and coinciding with
a period of deregulation, the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient de-
clines after a new increase in dismissal costs, only to increase again from
1995 onward. Their estimates for the long-run elasticities of severance pay
are very large (in absolute value). Between 1987 and 1990, a 10 percent in-
crease in dismissal costs is estimated to reduce long-run employment rates
by 11 percent, keeping wages constant. In subsequent periods, the size of
the eﬀect becomes smaller but is still quite large in magnitude (between 3
and 6 percent). In Argentina, the estimated long-run elasticity of a 10 per-
cent increase in dismissal costs is also between 3 and 6 percent.23
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22. The data for the Peruvian study covers ﬁrms with more than ten employees in all sec-
tors of the economy. The Argentinean study only covers manufacturing ﬁrms. Given the na-
ture of these surveys, these studies analyze formal employment rather than employment as a
whole. The data used in these two studies does not capture job creation by new ﬁrms, because
both panels are based on a given balanced panel census of ﬁrms, which does not adjust for at-
trition.
23. The methodology used by these studies might lead to upward biased estimates of the
elasticity of employment to job security. Thus, for example, Mondino and Montoya construct
explicit measures of job security based onKugler (chap. 3 in this volume) computes the net impact of the Colom-
bian 1991 labor reform on unemployment rates. Using unemployment and
employment exit rate estimates before and after the reform, she ﬁnds that
the reforms cause a decline in unemployment between 1.3 and 1.7 percent-
age points. Thus, as in Mondino and Montoya (chap. 6 in this volume) and
Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in this volume), Kugler’s estimates of the
impact of deregulation indicate that the positive impact of reduced labor
costs on hiring outweighs the negative impact of reduced severance costs
on ﬁring, resulting in a decline in unemployment rates.
Heckman and Pagés’s (2000) analysis of cross-section time series aggre-
gates also ﬁnds evidence of a negative impact of employment protection on
employment. However, the evidence presented at the end of this chapter
suggests that their results for Latin America are not robust, although their
results for OECD Europe are robust. The fragility of their estimates for
Latin America, based on aggregate data, suggests the value of using more
disaggregated data in reaching sharp conclusions.
Other studies ﬁnd negative, but statistically less precisely estimated, ef-
fects of job security on average employment rates. Pagés and Montenegro
(1999) ﬁnd that job security has a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant ef-
fect on overall wage-employment rates in Chile. Similarly, Marquéz (1998),
using a cross-section sample of Latin American and OECD countries,
ﬁnds a negative but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of job security on aggregate
employment rates. Table 6 summarizes the various estimates of job secu-
rity on employment.
Downes, Mamingi, and Antoine (chap. 10 in this volume) also use ag-
gregate time series data to examine changes in the labor demand associated
with changes in the regulatory framework in three Caribbean countries.
Their inconclusive results are typical of an entire literature. They use an in-
dicator variable that measures periods with more or less stringent regula-
tions. Their estimates do not capture changes in labor demand before and
after the reform. However, as in the case in most of the OECD-based liter-
ature, their sample variation in regulations and institutions may be too lim-
ited and the level of aggregation too great to capture any eﬀects of regula-
tion on employment.
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JSjt    jT jtP jtSP jt,
where  j is the average layoﬀ rate in sector j, T jt is average tenure in sector j for a time period t,
P jt is the share of ﬁrms in sector j for time period t that are covered by regulations, and SP jt is
the mandatory severance pay in sector j, given average tenure T jt. This measure provides vari-
ability across sectors and periods, and, therefore, it yields a more precise estimation of the im-
pact of job security than before-after types of comparisons. Yet, such a measure may also be
correlated with the error term in a labor demand equation because both layoﬀs and the tenure
structure of a ﬁrm might be correlated with its employment level. However, robustness analy-
ses reported in Mondino and Montoya suggest that not considering some of this variability
still produces positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimates for the coeﬃcient of the job secu-
rity measure.The Composition of Employment
Economists have paid relatively more attention to studying the eﬀects of
job security on the level of employment and unemployment than to study-
ing the eﬀects of such policies on the distribution of jobs. However, a few
studies shed some light on the impact of job security on the composition of
employment in LAC. Marquéz (1998) constructs a ranking of the relative
severity of labor market regulations (including workweek, contract, and
other regulations besides job security provisions) for LAC and OECD
countries and uses it to estimate the eﬀects of job security on the formal
and informal distribution of employment. He ﬁnds that across countries,
more stringent regulations coincide with a larger percentage of self-
employed workers. In a study of Chile, Montenegro and Pagés (chap. 7 in
this volume) use repeated cross-section microdata spanning forty years of
data and substantial variation in labor market policies. They control for
year eﬀects that are common across workers, as well as for the diﬀerential
eﬀects of the business cycle and other labor market policies on each demo-
graphic group. They ﬁnd that more stringent job security measures reduce
the employment rates of youth and the unskilled, while increasing the em-
ployment rates of older and skilled workers. Their results also suggest that
job security regulations increase the self-employment of women and un-
skilled workers, relative to other demographic groups. This evidence is con-
sistent with evidence in Bertola (2001) and Heckman (2003) that job secu-
rity provisions protect the relatively privileged workers at the expense of
the less advantaged ones. In a review of the recent OECD literature, rely-
ing on cross-country time series analysis, Addison and Teixeira (2001)
reach similar conclusions, stating that while prime-age male employment
rates have not been aﬀected by job security provisions, the employment
rates of other groups, most notably younger workers, have been aﬀected.
I.4.3 Temporary Contracts
Hopenhayn (chap. 9 in this volume) discusses the impact of temporary
contracts on the Argentine labor market. Such contracts were introduced
following the Spanish model. He ﬁnds that these contracts induce an in-
crease in hiring and a substitution away from long-term employment to-
ward short-term employment. So, in the short run, these contracts remove
one barrier from the labor market and make it more ﬂuid. At the same time,
they tend to promote turnover. Hopenhayn ﬁnds that the average hazard
rate for the ﬁrst three months out of employment increased by 30 percent
and for tenure above three months by 10 percent. While temporary con-
tracts promote ﬂuidity, they reduce ﬁrm attachment and the incentive of
ﬁrms to invest in workers. Alonso-Borrego and Aguirregabiria (1999) doc-
ument that in Spanish labor markets, the eﬀect of temporary contracts is
to reduce investment in workers and hence to produce lower quality (less-
skilled) workers in the long run.
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Maloney and Nuñez Mendez (chap. 1 in this volume) present novel esti-
mates of the impact of minimum wages on wage distributions and employ-
ment. Their evidence demonstrates convincingly that minimum wages are
binding in many Latin American countries and have substantial eﬀects on
employment and wage distributions. An important ﬁnding in their analysis
is that both covered and uncovered sectors (“formal” and “informal” sec-
tors) respond in similar fashion to wage minimums. The informal sector
does not show the downward wage ﬂexibility that traditional models of la-
bor market dualism predict. Another important ﬁnding is that minimum
wages percolate much more widely across wage distributions in Latin
America than they do in the United States. There are substantial eﬀects of
minimum wages on wages far up in the distribution of wages. Their study
puts to rest the claim that minimum wages are innocuous, even in countries
with large “informal” sectors.
Montenegro and Pagés (chap. 7 in this volume) study the eﬀects of min-
imum wages on the distribution of employment in Chile. They ﬁnd that,
like job security provisions, minimum wages reduce the employment prob-
abilities of the young and the unskilled, relative to older and more skilled
workers. Not surprisingly, as suggested in other studies for developed
countries, their results indicate that minimum wages are particularly bind-
ing for young unskilled workers. However, their results also indicate an ad-
verse eﬀect of the minimum wage on prime-age unskilled workers. Mini-
mum wages adversely aﬀect disadvantaged workers of all ages.
We next turn to a pooled time series cross-country study of the impact of
regulation on employment. The fragility and sensitivity of the estimates for
the Latin American region that we ﬁnd highlight the beneﬁts of the micro-
data analysis reported in this volume.
I.5 Evidence from a Cross-Section Time Series Sample 
of LAC and OECD Countries
In this section, we summarize and expand on some of the main results of
our recent work, updating our earlier paper (Heckman and Pagés 2000).
We use time series of cross sections of countries, and we exploit the sub-
stantial variability in labor laws in Latin America to estimate their eﬀects
on employment and unemployment. These studies serve to place the chap-
ters in this volume within the broader context of a literature that almost ex-
clusively focuses on time series of cross-section averages of countries. Un-
fortunately, few empirical regularities emerge when an honest sensitivity
analysis is conducted. Nonetheless, a few robust regularities do appear.
Payroll taxes reduce employment and (less robustly) in OECD countries,
job security regulation reduces employment.
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Labor market studies focusing on developing countries are hampered by
serious data problems. Thus, labor market variables contained in most
cross-country databases suﬀer from a lack of comparability and reliability.
To  overcome these problems, we construct a new data set that includes
OECD and LAC countries. For OECD countries, we collect employment
and unemployment data from the OECD statistics. For the Latin Ameri-
can sample, we directly construct the same indicators out of a large set of
Latin American household surveys. See appendix A for a more detailed de-
scription of the employment and unemployment variables as well as the
countries and years used to obtain the LAC data. Population variables are
obtained from the United Nations (UN) population database while GDP
measures are from the World Bank development indicators. To character-
ize labor market regulations, we use the set of measures summarized in
table 4, deﬁned for each year and country.
Our joint sample collects more than 400 data points from thirty-eight
countries; twenty-three in the OECD and ﬁfteen in the LAC. (Mexico is in-
cluded in the Latin America sample although it belongs to the OECD.) We
analyze country means and do not disaggregate further. The sample is an
unbalanced panel covering the period 1983–1999. Table 7 reports sum-
mary statistics of our data for both our whole sample and for the sub-
regional ones.24There are large diﬀerences between the OECD and the LAC
samples. The GDP per capita measures tend to be substantially lower in
the LAC than in the OECD region. Conversely, GDP growth is lower in
the latter. Indemnities for dismissal and seniority pay are higher in Latin
America than in OECD countries, while advance notice provisions and
social security contributions are lower. There are important diﬀerences in
labor market aggregates as well. On average, employment rates are higher
in the LAC region than in OECD countries. The reverse is true for un-
employment rates. The LAC region also displays a lower percentage of the
working-age population in the twenty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-four-year-old and the
ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve-year-old brackets than OECD countries and a higher
share of the population in the ﬁfteen- to twenty-four-year-old age group.
By constructing our own data set from individual household-level surveys,
we are guaranteed that all of the labor market variables are comparable
and reliable. One drawback of our data is that for the LAC sample, we only
have a few time series observations per country (usually six or seven), and
not necessarily from consecutive years.
Our objective is to relate our measures of regulations to employment
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24. Table 7 reports the data used in the baseline speciﬁcation (see also table 8, column [1]).
In the speciﬁcations where regulations are entered one to one, the number of observations
used is larger because we have more data on some regulations than on others. Restricting the
sample size to be equal to the one used in the baseline speciﬁcation does not alter any of the
results.Table 7 Summary Statistics of Sample used in Baseline Regression
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Min. Max.
A. Total Sample (N   417)
Employment/Population 54.92 7.16 36.90 76.89
Unemployment rate (N   416) 7.82 4.33 0.50 23.80
Log GDP per capita PPP adjusted 9.43 0.63 7.35 10.37
GDP growth 2.92 2.77 –8.59 12.82
Share of working age pop. 25–54 0.62 0.03 0.51 0.68
Share of working age pop. 55–64 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.19
Social Security (% wage) 0.27 0.15 0.00 0.71
Advance noticea 0.82 0.48 0.00 1.97
Indemnities for dismissala 1.27 1.40 0.00 5.97
Seniority paya 0.65 2.35 0.00 9.82
Social Securitya 35.65 19.13 0.00 91.53
B. Latin America (N   88)
Employment/Population 59.09 5.35 47.10 76.89
Unemployment rate 6.52 3.23 0.63 17.10
Log GDP per capita PPP adjusted 8.49 0.45 7.35 9.44
GDP growth 3.31 3.60 –8.59 12.82
Share of working age pop. 25–54 0.58 0.03 0.51 0.64
Share of working age pop. 55–64 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.16
Social Security (% wage) 0.23 0.08 0.10 0.42
Advance noticea 0.65 0.45 0.00 1.77
Indemnities for dismissala 2.82 1.05 0.00 5.97
Seniority paya 3.09 4.33 0.00 9.82
Social Securitya 30.14 10.17 12.98 53.87
C. Industrial Countries Sample (N   329)
Employment/Population 53.81 7.17 36.90 68.60
Unemployment rate (N   328) 8.17 4.52 0.50 23.80
Log GDP per capita PPP adjusted 9.68 0.38 8.50 10.37
GDP growth 2.81 2.50 –7.00 10.74
Share of working age pop. 25–54 0.62 0.03 0.57 0.68
Share of working age pop. 55–64 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.19
Social Security (% wage) 0.29 0.16 0.00 0.71
Advance noticea 0.87 0.48 0.00 1.97
Indemnities for dismissal 0.86 1.17 0.00 3.30
Seniority pay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social Securitya 37.12 20.65 0.00 91.53
aRegulatory variables measured in multiples of monthly wages.and unemployment outcomes. Although we perform multivariate analy-
ses, it is interesting to examine the bivariate relationship between regula-
tions and employment. This is particularly easy for regulations such as job
security provisions that, within our sample, change at most once or twice
per country. In ﬁgures 8 and 9, we graph employment before and after re-
forms for countries that experienced job security reforms. The graphs for
LAC should be interpreted with caution because they have been interpo-
lated from incomplete time series data.
There is little evidence that reforms that reduced job security increased
employment rates in Colombia. There is also not much evidence that re-
forms that increased job security had a deleterious eﬀect on employment
in Brazil, Chile, or Nicaragua. However, there is some evidence indicating
that reforms that liberalized labor markets in Peru increased employment
rates, while reforms that increased labor market rigidities reduced employ-
ment. For Germany, our data suggest that employment declined at a slower
rate after a reform that increased job security, while in Spain and the
United Kingdom the opposite seems to be true after liberalization. These
ﬁgures suggest that periods of less stringent job security regulations coin-
cide with higher employment rates in some countries, while the reverse is
also true in other countries. The data presented in these ﬁgures, however,
fail to control for contemporaneous changes in economic activity or other
factors that could be correlated with employment and labor reforms. In the
next section, we perform an empirical analysis in an attempt to control for
contemporaneous eﬀects that may be correlated with reforms, employ-
ment, and unemployment outcomes.
I.5.2 Methodology and Results
To relate labor market regulations to employment and unemployment
outcomes, we estimate the following model:
Y it    i    1Xit    2git    3GDPPCit    4Zit   εit,
where Yit is a labor market variable (employment or unemployment) of
country i at period t,  i denotes a country ﬁxed eﬀect, Xit denotes a vector
of employment regulation variables, git, and GDPPCitdenote GDP growth
and (log of) GDP per capita, respectively, Zit is a vector of demographic
controls, and εit is a mean zero error.
Given the nature of the data with incomplete gaps, we decided not to av-
erage observations from a given period to control for business cycle eﬀects,
as is often done in OECD studies. Instead, we control for the state of the
business cycle in a given year using GDP growth.25 Although a large part
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25. The GDP growth is obtained from the World Bank development indicators. It turns out
that deleting or including this variable has no important eﬀect on our empirical conclusions.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of our variation is cross sectional, we use ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates to control
for unobserved variables that may be correlated with measures of regula-
tion across countries. In addition, we control for demographic changes
that may be correlated with employment and unemployment rates as well
as regulatory variables that change over time. Finally, we use GDP per
capita (adjusted by PPP) to control for diﬀerences in levels of country eco-
nomic activity across years.26 We estimate a reduced form model to inves-
tigate whether periods of high nonwage labor costs stemming from ad-
vance notice, indemnities for dismissal, severance pay, or social security
contributions are associated with lower employment or higher unemploy-
ment rates. We thus estimate an average net eﬀect of labor laws as they
operate through intermediate variables, which we do not include in the
regression. We do not estimate a theoretically more appropriate state-
contingent labor demand speciﬁcation because we lack the information on
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc state of the product market confronting individual ﬁrms.
Therefore, we only attempt to identify the eﬀect of labor laws through their
eﬀect on expected (across labor market states) labor cost. This is a severe
limitation. However, what we oﬀer is an improvement over the existing lit-
erature on cross-country time series that does not quantify labor costs. Ap-
pendix B discusses conceptually more appropriate speciﬁcations of labor
demand functions.
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Fig. 9 The eﬀect of job security reform on employment: Industrial countries
Source: Labor force statistics, OECD.
26. We control for GDP growth and GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) because we have few
data points per country and they are not necessarily contiguous, so we cannot use the simple
averaging method employed in OECD studies to control for business-cycle eﬀects.Table 8 displays our estimates for employment in the overall and re-
gional samples. In these and subsequent results, we compute standard er-
rors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. Throughout this analysis, we ex-
tend social security data to yearly frequencies because this information is
only available biannually. We do so either by interpolating or by inputting
each missing data value with the value from the former year. The results of
our empirical analysis are robust across methods. Also, the results do not
vary when we consider only the original biennial data. However, in this
case, the number of available observations drops substantially.
The coeﬃcients on GDP growth have the expected positive signs and are
statistically signiﬁcant for the overall sample. The coeﬃcients on the de-
mographic variables are positive, suggesting that countries with larger per-
centages of their working age population above age twenty-ﬁve tend to
have higher employment rates. However, none of the coeﬃcients on the de-
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Table 8 Results for Employment to Population Rates
Whole Sample OECD Latin American
Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AN 13.938 12.400 13.755 16.637
(15.959) (16.841) (14.564) (15.420)
ID 1.161 –0.469 –2.577 0.330
(0.897) (0.730) (1.196)∗∗ (1.637)
SenP 3.292 1.837 n.a. 1.887
(1.195)∗∗∗ (0.213)∗∗∗ (2.197)
SSC –0.230 –0.191 –0.301 –0.187
(0.081)∗∗∗ (0.079)∗∗ (0.102)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗
GDP growth 0.094 0.125 0.123 0.110 0.108 0.034 0.106
(0.046)∗∗ (0.050)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗ (0.046)∗∗ (0.050) (0.072)
Log GDP per 2.318 –0.320 –0.451 0.834 3.122 1.828 11.639
capita (1.277) (1.044) (1.079) (2.253) (2.260) (1.334) (8.152)
Share WAP
25–54 17.584 29.171 33.259 22.143 16.534 12.112 9.126
(16.750) (16.608) (18.135) (21.704) (23.535) (19.197) (70.273)
55–64 48.456 20.450 27.060 20.614 59.725 50.009 –197.99
(35.685) (27.018) (27.465) (26.721) (33.501) (35.553) (317.709)
Constant 13.588 28.759 37.614 32.086 17.013 8.519 –40.525
(17.743) (18.736) (13.754)∗∗∗ (13.318)∗∗ (13.165) (31.305) (55.759)
N 417 476 480 564 484 329 88
R2 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.82
P-value F testa 0.00 0.04 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All speciﬁcation includes country ﬁxed eﬀects. AN   ad-
vance notice; ID   indemnities dismissal; SenP   seniority pay; SSC   Social Security contribution;
WAP   working age population; N   number of observations; n.a.   not applicable.
aP-value of test that all regulations are jointly equal to zero.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.mographic variables are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. A
higher GDP per capita tends to coincide with higher employment to pop-
ulation rates. However, this estimated eﬀect is not precisely determined.
Our main interest is on measuring the eﬀect of the labor market regula-
tions. We ﬁnd that once we expand our sample to include a larger number
of OECD and LAC countries, the strong negative eﬀect on employment of
indemnities for dismissal reported for the pooled sample in Heckman and
Pagés (2000) disappears. This is somewhat surprising because not only do
we expand the set of countries and periods for which we can construct the
measure, but we also revise some of the variables used in our previous anal-
ysis to more accurately model the laws. We still estimate a negative, statis-
tically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for indemnities in the OECD speciﬁcation,
and this is an important contribution to the European debate on the im-
pact of regulations. This evidence suggests a signiﬁcant lack of robustness
of the estimated eﬀect of regulations that we explore in detail.
With regard to the rest of the regulations, we ﬁnd a positive, although
not statistically signiﬁcant, coeﬃcient on advance notice cost both in the
joint and in the subregional samples. Because seniority pay regulations
only exist in Latin America, we cannot identify the impact of these regula-
tions in the OECD sample. However, we ﬁnd positive coeﬃcients for this
variable both in the LAC and in the pooled sample. Moreover, the coeﬃ-
cient in the joint sample is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The
estimated coeﬃcient suggests that an increase in payments equivalent to
one month’s pay (in expected present value) increasesemployment rates by
1.12 percentage points. One might argue that the strong association be-
tween contributions and beneﬁts associated with these types of schemes
contributes to an expansion of labor supply increasing overall employment
rates. However, the coeﬃcients on advance notice and on indemnities are
also positive. In contrast to these results, our estimates suggest a negative
eﬀect of social security contributions on employment both in the joint and
the subregional samples. (Recall that this is the total contribution of em-
ployers and workers.) This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. According to
our estimates, a reduction in the social security contributions from the
OECD to the LAC average (see table 4) would increase employment by
3.25 percentage points for the coeﬃcients from the joint sample or by 4.26
percentage points if the OECD coeﬃcient is used (table 8, columns [1] and
[6], respectively).
Because there is substantial correlation among our measures of labor
market regulation, we also estimate speciﬁcations that include these mea-
sures one at a time.27 The number of observations used in each regression
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27. The correlation coeﬃcient between advance notice, indemnities for dismissal, and sen-
iority pay is between 0.15 and 0.21 (in absolute value) and statistically signiﬁcant. Social se-
curity contributions are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with advance notice, but the
correlation with the other measures is close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant.varies because there are countries for which we do not have information for
all the regulation measures. The results are unchanged if we restrict all re-
gressions to have the same observations than the ones used in column (1).
Adding the regulation measures separately tends to produce smaller co-
eﬃcients for each of them, suggesting that there are important comple-
mentarities that are not captured by the one-at-a-time speciﬁcations. We
strongly reject the hypothesis that the four measures are not jointly signif-
icant (last row, table 8) and therefore include them together in the remain-
ing analysis.
Table 9 presents the estimates for unemployment. As for employment,
indemnities for dismissal have a strong positive eﬀect on unemployment in
the OECD sample but no eﬀect in the Latin America or the joint sample.
The coeﬃcient on advance notice is negative in the overall and OECD
samples, but not in the LAC sample. However, the coeﬃcient is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant in any sample. The coeﬃcient on seniority pay is also
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Table 9 Results for Unemployment
Whole Sample OECD Latin American
Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AN –9.13 –7.29 –9.19 4.06
(11.08) (11.03) (10.62) (9.96)
ID 0.50 –0.01 3.00 0.43
(1.00) (0.40) (1.01)∗∗∗ (1.12)
SenP 0.79 0.21 n.a. 0.84
(1.33) (0.13) (1.43)
SSC 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.15
(0.07)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.09)∗∗ (0.09)
GDP growth –0.16 –0.19 –0.18 –0.18 –0.14 –0.13 –0.23
(0.04)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.09)∗∗
GDP per  –2.28 1.78 1.55 1.87 –1.47 –2.70 4.37
capita (1.26) (1.27) (1.05) (1.28) (1.30) (1.36) (3.13)
Share WAP
25–54 18.85 –2.72 –5.72 –4.27 17.19 25.20 –66.30
(14.26) (16.00) (16.72) (14.98) (16.96) (16.44) (29.54)∗∗
55–64 –7.35 6.69 2.17 –15.41 –14.69 –7.97 134.98
(28.58) (24.90) (25.19) (22.29) (25.26) (31.36) (214.64)
Constant 23.01 1.13 –3.20 1.05 13.19 28.44 –16.54
(13.02) (12.88) (9.99) (7.40) (7.63) (23.31) (34.32)
N 416 475 479 563 483 328 88
R2 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.86 0.72
P-value F test 0.02 0.03 0.00
Note: See table 8. All speciﬁcations contain country ﬁxed eﬀects.
aP-value of test that all regulations are jointly equal to zero.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.positive, suggesting that these schemes increase labor supply. However, the
coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, and consistent with our
results on employment, we ﬁnd that higher social security contributions
are associated with higher levels of unemployment in the three samples
considered. Our point estimates suggest that reducing social security con-
tributions from the OECD to the LAC average reduces unemployment by
2.54 percentage points if we use the estimate for the joint sample or 3.11
percentage points if we use the OECD one. As with the case of employ-
ment, adding the regulatory measures one at a time produces smaller co-
eﬃcients for each of the measures. As before, we reject the hypothesis that
the coeﬃcients of the four variables are jointly equal to zero, and, there-
fore, we will include them in the rest of the unemployment analysis.
Our results in tables 8 and 9 suggest that not all regulations have the
same eﬀect on employment and unemployment rates. Because all regula-
tions are measured in multiples of monthly wages, we can compare the
coeﬃcients of the four regulations studied and assess whether they have
similar eﬀects. In table 10 we report the results of testing the hypothesis
of equality of coeﬃcients. We reject the null hypothesis of identical coeﬃ-
cients for the four measures in the employment, but not in the unemploy-
ment, speciﬁcations. Interestingly, we are also able to reject the hypothesis
that social security payments exert the same eﬀect on employment as sen-
iority pay, despite the fact that both variables imply mandatory contribu-
tions deﬁned as a fraction of wages. Perhaps because contributions to ﬁ-
nance seniority pay are capitalized in individual accounts, the link between
contributions and payments is strengthened, and this reduces or eliminates
the “tax” eﬀect. Instead, our results suggest that social security contribu-
tions tend to be perceived as taxes on labor and, therefore, reduce the de-
mand of labor above and beyond a possible reduction in the supply of la-
bor. Moreover, we reject the hypothesis that indemnities for dismissal and
seniority pay have the same coeﬃcient or that all components of job secu-
rity (advance notice, indemnities for dismissal, and seniority pay) have the
same coeﬃcient. When we impose this (incorrect) constraint on the data,
we obtain a positive but not statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on job secu-
rity regulations, while the coeﬃcient on social security regulations remains
negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, although we reject the hypothesis that all four regulations have
the same eﬀect on employment, imposing this constraint yields a negative,
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on employment and a positive, statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on unemployment. Moreover, the size of the
coeﬃcients is very similar to the ones reported in tables 8 and 9 for social
security. This is not surprising, because social security regulations consti-
tute the lion’s share of the total cost of regulations.
In summary, our results suggest that not all regulations have the same
eﬀect on employment rates. Thus, while social security contributions are
Introduction 75negatively associated with employment (and positively associated with un-
employment), the eﬀect of job security measures on employment is am-
biguous. While in the joint and LAC samples, advance notice and indem-
nities for dismissal have positive, although not statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, the coeﬃcient on indemnities in the OECD sample is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Seniority pay is posi-
tively associated with employment, and the coeﬃcients on this variable are
statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. We also reject the hypothe-
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Table 10 Do all regulations have an equal eﬀect?: Whole Sample
Employment Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AN   ID –0.644 0.121
(0.651) (0.342)
SenP   SSC –0.229 0.169
(0.081)∗∗ (0.066)∗∗




AN   ID   SenP –0.231 0.169
  SSC (0.079)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗
GDP growth 0.089 0.090 0.089 –0.157 –0.157 –0.157
(0.045) (0.045)∗∗ (0.045) (0.040)∗∗∗ (0.040)∗∗∗ (0.040)∗∗∗
Log(GDP) per capita  2.283 2.222 2.246 –2.276 –2.283 –2.281
PPP adjusted (1.314) (1.319) (1.324) (1.272) (1.271) (1.269)
% of WAP
25–54 19.660 20.788 20.662 20.431 20.557 20.548
(17.441) (18.116) (18.018) (15.120) (14.953) (14.926)
55–64 56.924 57.644 58.367 –5.119 –5.007 –4.949
(35.411) (36.408) (35.863) (29.241) (29.024) (29.031)
Constant 27.194 23.669 25.604 15.621 15.285 15.438
(13.367) (13.226) (13.741) (10.285) (10.434) (9.910)
N 417 417 417 416 416 416
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.84 0.84 0.84
Test
AN   IDa 0.42 0.39
SenP   SSC 0.005 0.64
AN   ID   SenP 0.00 0.49
ID   SenP 0.00 0.39
AN   ID   SenP   SSC 0.01 0.63
Notes: See table 8. All speciﬁcations contain country ﬁxed eﬀects. PPP   purchasing power parity US$
adjusted.
aP-values of the tests in this row and below.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.sis that the coeﬃcients on seniority pay and the coeﬃcients on the rest of
the components of job security are the same. These diﬀerences in results
across regions, speciﬁcations, and samples, relative to our previous work,
suggest a lack of robustness that we further explore. Before turning to a ro-
bustness analysis, we ﬁrst consider the evidence on the shifting of the pay-
roll tax.
Wage Shifts
What is the estimated wage pass-through implied by our coeﬃcients on
social security contributions? The social security eﬀect is a robust ﬁnding
of our aggregate country analysis and so is worth exploring further. Deﬁne
  as the elasticity of employment with respect to the cost of labor. Assume
that social security taxes are expressed as a percentage of wages. Writing
labor demand as a function of wages inclusive of taxes in log linear form,
we obtain
ln EMP(SS)   ln[W(SS)(SS)]   C,
where SS is the fraction of wages marked up by social security and W(SS)
is the wage which depends on SS through equilibrium shifting eﬀects, and
C is a constant standing in for all other factors. Taking derivatives with re-
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To estimate the wage shift, we estimate (∂ ln EMP(SS))/(∂ ln SS) from a
speciﬁcation with the same control variables as the speciﬁcation reported
in table 8, column (1), but where the dependent variable is in logs, advance
notice, indemnities for dismissal, and seniority pay are deﬁned in logs, and
social security contributions are deﬁned as fractions of gross wages, and we
use ln(SS) as a regressor. Finally, the elasticity of labor demand to labor
costs,  , is assumed to be within the ranges of estimates reported in table 4
and consistent with the estimates reported in these studies. With all of
these elements, we obtain the estimates presented in table 11.28
We ﬁnd that the elasticity of employment with respect to social security
contributions is –0.7 for the whole sample, around –1 for the OECD
sample and –0.447 for Latin America. This implies that increasing social
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28. Hamermesh (1993) reports a range of elasticities between –0.15 and –0.7. We constrain
wage eﬀects of SS in table 11 to be nonpositive.security contributions by 10 percentage points will lower employment by 7
percent in the overall sample, 10 percent in the OECD and 4.5 percent in
Latin America. These are large numbers. They also imply that for a large
range of labor demand elasticities, the estimated pass-through is zero, par-
ticularly for the OECD sample. Thus, for a labor demand elasticity of –0.7,
the pass-through is zero in OECD and 36 percent in Latin America. Al-
though this larger pass-through in Latin America is at odds with the pre-
sumption of a very elastic labor supply to the formal sector, it is consistent
with a much higher wage ﬂexibility in Latin America than in industrial
countries, due to greater inﬂation in the region (see IADB 2004). All in all,
this evidence suggests that part of the cost of regulations is borne by work-
ers but that social security contributions tend to be perceived as taxes on
labor. Increasing social security taxes leads to substantial costs in terms of
reductions in employment and increases in unemployment.
I.5.3 The Eﬀect of Recent Social Security Reforms
Our negative coeﬃcients on social security contributions suggest that
the beneﬁts associated with these contributions are valued at less than 100
percent of their cost. An interesting question is whether the recent wave of
pension reforms in Latin America have contributed to strengthen the link
between contributions and beneﬁts as well as to increase the size of the
wage pass-through. This is especially relevant because most reforms trans-
formed pay-as-you-go systems into full or partial capitalization systems.
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Table 11 Estimates of Wage Pass-Through for Diﬀerent Labor
Demand Elasticities
Labor Demand Whole OECD Latin American













































  –1.2 –.415 –.12 –.62
Notes: ∂ ln Emp/∂ ln SS is obtained from a regression in which the dependent variable is
computed in logarithms and all regulatory variables are also computed in logs. The other con-
trol variables used in table 8 are used here. Social security contributions are deﬁned as loga-
rithms of the fraction of the contribution rate, that is we use ln(SS). Standard errors are in
parentheses. The other three rows are obtained from the formula in the text, using alternative
values of  , as shown in the ﬁrst column of the table. When estimated eﬀects on wages are pos-
itive, they are constrained to be zero.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.To examine this possibility we create a dummy variable, Reform, which, for
each country, takes the value of zero in the period prereform and 1 from the
period of reform onward (see appendix A for a full description of the peri-
ods of reform). We add this variable and an interaction of reform with the
cost of social security payments to our baseline speciﬁcations (tables 8 and
9 column [1]). Our results suggest contemporaneous positive eﬀects of pen-
sion reforms on employment. (See table 12.) However, it is unclear whether
this positive eﬀect is associated with the reforms themselves or with other
factors. Thus, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
the Reform variable, suggesting an increase in employment rates in the
postreform period. However, the interaction term with social security re-
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Table 12 The Eﬀect of Pension Reforms on Employment and Unemployment
Employment Unemployment
Latin Latin 
Whole OECD American Whole OECD American
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AN 14.080 13.755 1.184 –9.090 –9.195 17.297
(15.629) (14.564) (14.721) (11.011) (10.617) (11.379)
ID 1.286 –2.577 0.087 0.470 3.005 0.742
(0.979) (1.196)∗∗ (1.702) (1.001) (1.008)∗∗∗ (1.089)
SenP 3.480 0.000 1.624 0.739 n.a. 1.247
(1.305)∗∗ (0.000) (2.299) (1.332) (1.406)
SSC –0.243 –0.301 –0.168 0.173 0.215 0.118
(0.088)∗∗∗ (0.102)∗∗ (0.086) (0.071)∗∗ (0.098)∗∗ (0.087)
SSC   Reform –0.138 0.000 –0.327 0.124 0.000 0.248
(0.072) (0.000) (0.134)∗∗ (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.000) (0.109)∗∗
Reform 7.290 0.000 10.665 –4.349 0.000 –7.234
(3.174)∗∗ (0.000) (4.765)∗∗ (1.926)∗∗ (0.000) (3.758)
GDP growth 0.096 0.034 0.123 –0.164 –0.130 –0.239
(0.048) (0.050) (0.084) (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.086)∗∗
Log GDP per capita 2.348 1.828 10.742 –2.336 –2.700 4.983
(1.227) (1.334) (7.643) (1.236) (1.355) (3.292)
% of WAP
25–54 15.011 12.112 34.692 20.505 25.196 –93.257
(16.884) (19.197) (69.954) (14.199) (16.442) (34.205)∗∗
55–64 45.690 50.009 –449.346 –2.593 –7.975 365.975
(35.828) (35.553) (298.027) (28.761) (31.360) (223.294)
Constant 15.044 8.519 1.087 20.739 28.443 –49.617
(17.348) (31.305) (52.262) (12.965) (23.305) (36.657)
N 417 329 88 416 328 88
R2 0.92 0.93 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.76
Notes: See table 8. See table A.1 for a deﬁnition of Reform variable.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.form is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that social security
taxes have larger disemployment eﬀects after the reforms. This higher dis-
incentive could be due to the mixed eﬀects resulting from the transition to
the new system. As workers move from the pay-as-you-go to the capital-
ization system, contributions to social security ﬁnance individual accounts
and, in many instances, the pensions of those left in the old system. The
contribution to fund the old system is likely to be viewed as a pure tax on
employment.
I.5.4 Robustness
The results reported in this section are based on larger samples and de-
part substantially from those reported in Heckman and Pagés (2000).29Un-
fortunately, a lack of robustness to changes in speciﬁcation or sample size
is all too common in the cross-section time-series literature that uses aggre-
gate data. Given this potential weakness, we investigate whether our new re-
sults are robust to changes in estimation method, measures of regulations,
speciﬁcation and sample size, as well as to the exclusion of outliers.
Given the limited variance of the job security variables, it is interesting
to compare our ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients with the results obtained from es-
timating our main equation using random eﬀects (RE; see table 13). We re-
ject the hypothesis of consistency of the RE estimator for employment in
the joint sample at 10 percent. The most substantial diﬀerence is the con-
siderably smaller magnitude of the coeﬃcient on indemnities for the
OECD sample in the RE model. While in the OECD sample we still ﬁnd a
negative eﬀect of indemnities on employment and a positive eﬀect on un-
employment, these eﬀects are no longer statistically signiﬁcant at conven-
tional levels. The coeﬃcient on advance notice is now positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant in the employment regressions and negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in the unemployment regressions. The size and sig-
niﬁcance of the social security contribution coeﬃcients are robust to the
change in method of estimation.
In unreported results available upon request, we also examine whether
our results are robust to alternative measurements of the cost of regula-
tions that do not require assumptions about discount or layoﬀ rates. Fol-
lowing Lazear (1990), we measure job security regulations as the manda-
tory amount (in multiples of monthly wages) that should be paid to a
worker who is dismissed after ten years of tenure. A major disadvantage of
this measure is that it only reﬂects job security in one point of the job se-
curity tenure schedule. In our samples, both his measure and our measure
yield similar results.
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29. We are greatly indebted to David Bravo and Sergio Urzua, who made us aware that
adding Chile to the original sample used in Heckman and Pagés (2000) substantially changes
our earlier conclusions.We also assess the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion or exclusion
of additional control variables such as year eﬀects, region-speciﬁc year
eﬀects, time trends, and region-speciﬁc time trends. The results on the
eﬀect of social security contributions on employment and unemployment
are very robust to changes in speciﬁcation. Other results are less robust.
For instance, in a speciﬁcation with region-speciﬁc year-ﬁxed eﬀects, the
coeﬃcient on seniority pay is still positive, but it is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Adding or deleting either growth rates or
GDP levels does not change our conclusions.
Important diﬀerences also arise when we assess the sensitivity of our
baseline results to changes in sample size. In particular, we ﬁnd that both
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Table 13 Random Eﬀect Estimates
Employment Unemployment
Total OECD LAC Total OECD LAC
Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AN 4.142 5.292 1.417 –2.762 –3.560 –0.200
(1.871)∗∗ (1.986)∗∗∗ (4.461) (1.278)∗∗ (1.733)∗∗ (1.997)
ID –0.250 –1.010 –0.358 0.027 0.326 –0.048
(0.347) (0.809) (0.464) (0.266) (0.706) (0.298)
SenP 0.899 0.000 0.562 –0.074 0.000 0.009
(0.331)∗∗∗ (0.000) (0.438) (0.225) (0.000) (0.202)
SSC –0.221 –0.259 –0.164 0.135 0.153 0.090
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗∗ (0.050)
GDP growth 0.089 0.030 0.123 –0.157 –0.133 –0.205
(0.046) (0.051) (0.097) (0.038)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗ (0.068)∗∗∗
Log GDP per  2.292 1.837 8.931 –2.117 –2.606 1.607
capita (PPP) (0.826)∗∗∗ (0.784)∗∗ (3.251)∗∗∗ (0.668)∗∗∗ (0.705)∗∗∗ (1.869)
Share of WAP
25–54 17.462 8.760 21.529 21.471 26.494 –11.405
(10.657) (10.682) (37.575) (8.598)∗∗ (9.616)∗∗∗ (22.081)
55–64 48.130 34.748 –76.504 1.544 2.022 21.309
(20.842)∗∗ (21.002) (75.751) (16.411) (18.910) (40.005)
Constant 18.202 31.222 –19.363 12.749 13.938 –3.868
(6.616)∗∗∗ (6.896)∗∗∗ (15.833) (5.169)∗∗ (6.160)∗∗ (9.823)
N 417 329 88 416 328 88
Hausman Test 
(P-value) 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.51
R2 0.46 0.48 0.004 0.15 0.14 0.26
Notes:See table 8 for explanations of abbreviations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1)
and (4) include a dummy variable that identiﬁes the region, and which takes the value equal to 1 if the
country is in Latin America and zero otherwise. PPP   purchasing power parity US$ adjusted; LAC  
Latin American and Caribbean.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.the coeﬃcients on advance notice provisions and indemnities for dismissal
are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of some countries in the sample,
while the coeﬃcients on social security payments and seniority pay do not
change. For instance, excluding Germany from the sample greatly in-
creases the coeﬃcient on advance notice in the baseline employment spec-
iﬁcation. Similarly, excluding Brazil or Peru changes the coeﬃcient on in-
demnities for dismissal in the employment regressions.
Finally, we check whether our results are robust to the exclusion of out-
liers, which are deﬁned as those observations for which the diﬀerence in the
regression coeﬃcient when the ith observation is included and when it is
not, scaling the diﬀerence by the estimated standard error of the coeﬃ-
cient, is larger than 2/ n   (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). Our results
conﬁrm that there are no outliers that alter the coeﬃcients for social secu-
rity contributions. There are a few outliers that modify the coeﬃcients on
job security provisions (advance notice, indemnities, and seniority pay).
However, they do not qualitatively alter our baseline results.
Taken as a whole, our results suggest that the negative (and statistically
signiﬁcant) association between social security contributions and employ-
ment, as well as a positive association between social security contributions
and unemployment, is very robust to changes in estimation method, speci-
ﬁcation, regional sample, sample size, and outliers. The coeﬃcients on our
job security measures are much less robust. Thus, while the ﬁxed eﬀect (FE)
estimates provide some evidence that in some OECD countries reducing in-
demnities results in higher employment rates, the evidence across countries
provided by our RE estimates is less conclusive. One component of job se-
curity, seniority pay, is positively correlated with employment.
I.5.5 Endogeneity
It is often argued that labor reforms are put in place when labor market
performance is poor. As demonstrated in the ﬁgure 3 plots, this is some-
times true for reforms in the LAC region. If a decline in employment rates
(and an increase in unemployment rates) prompts a reduction in labor
market regulations, then least squares estimates will be upward biased, po-
tentially underestimating a negative relationship between job security or
social security taxes and employment. Our baseline speciﬁcation partly
controls for the possibility of such reverse causality because the propensity
for reform is partly captured by changes in the GDP or demographic con-
ditions. Another source of concern is the timing of reforms. If labor re-
forms that liberalize the labor market are undertaken at particularly bad
times, an estimated negative relationship between employment and regu-
lations could just be the consequence of mean reversion.
In the results available on request, we address these issues in various
ways. First, we attempt to control for diﬀerences in the propensity to re-
form at diﬀerent points in time by including current and past GDP rates up
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associated with poor GDP outcomes, the inclusion of this set of variables
will control for the propensity to reform. Second, we control for the timing
of reforms by interacting changes in regulatory variables with a variable
that measures the distance (in years) between the current year and the last
business-cycle trough. Finally, we directly address the problem of reverse
causality by using the dependency ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of the popula-
tion aged sixty-ﬁve and older to the population in the working age (ﬁfteen
to sixty-four), as an instrument for social security contributions.30 Our re-
sults suggest that controlling for either the propensity or the timing of re-
forms does not alter the conclusions of our analysis.31
Regarding our instrumental variable estimates, table 14 indicates that in
the three samples considered, social security contributions increase with
the dependency ratio. The average dependency ratio in our sample is 0.17,
while OECD and LAC are 0.19 and 0.08, respectively. The coeﬃcients in
table 14 suggest that if the dependency ratio increases in 1 percentage
point, expected discounted social security contributions increase in 1.12
months for the total sample, 1.02 for the OECD, and 2.83 for Latin Amer-
ica. Moreover, our instrumental variable estimates (table 15) suggest that
there is a causal relation between changes in social security contributions
and changes in employment and unemployment rates, at least in the over-
all and OECD sample. In these two samples, IV estimates produce larger
coeﬃcients than the FE regressions. Instead, the Latin America IV esti-
Introduction 83
30. The source of this data is the United Nations Population Statistics (United Nations
Population Fund 1988).
31. Another way to control for endogeneity is to use the information in the ﬁgure 3 sequence
to break out episodes of reform that were not preceded by major downturns (or upturns) of
the economy from other episodes and analyze the latter. The problem with this approach in
our sample is that it uses up too many scarce degrees of freedom.
Table 14 Correlation between Dependency Ratio and 
Social Security Contributions
Social Security Payments (EPV)
Total OECD Latin America
Dependency ratio 112.10 102.38 283.6
(14.65)∗∗∗ (14.97)∗∗∗ (133.30)∗∗∗
Country ﬁxed eﬀects? Yes Yes Yes
N 514 411 86
R2 0.09 0.09 0.46
Notes: Dependency ratio computed as the ratio of the population 65 and older to the work-
ing age population (15–64). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.mates yield coeﬃcients with opposite signs to the ones obtained with the
FE regressions. However, such coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The small number of observations available for Latin America is not suﬃ-
cient to obtain precise IV estimates in this region.
I.5.6 Summary
Our analysis of pooled time series cross sections of countries under-
scores why the studies examining the impact of regulations in OECD coun-
tries based on such data have produced such ambiguous results. Lack of
variation in the relevant policy measures and poor measures of regulation
have hampered empirical analyses of the eﬀect of regulations on labor
market outcomes. To surmount these problems, we have expanded the
number of countries comprising the LAC region, included more within-
country variation, and improved the measures of regulation. Contrary to
previously reported estimates, we have found little evidence of a systematic
relationship between advance notice and indemnities for dismissal on em-
ployment or unemployment in our improved and expanded sample for
Latin America. Estimates vary across countries, with some countriesshow-
ing gains in employment after reducing job security and others showing
little beneﬁt to the employment rate or even employment reductions after
such reforms, but no clear pattern emerges from the aggregates.
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Table 15 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Employment Unemployment
Latin Latin
Total OECD America Total OECD America
AN 26.66 23.77 30.77 –15.72 –15.10 –12.73
(16.26) (13.51) (24.61) (11.29) (10.01) (19.86)
ID –1.08 –7.15 2.33 1.73 5.80 –1.64
(2.31) (2.38)∗∗∗ (3.71) (1.68) (1.94)∗∗∗ (2.29)
SenP –0.41 0.00 5.10 2.81 0.00 –2.55
(3.56) (0.00) (5.42) (2.50) (0.00) (3.22)
SSC –1.37 –1.28 0.36 0.77 0.80 –0.47
(0.78)∗ (0.66)∗ (0.58) (0.48) (0.45)∗ (0.38)
N 404 321 83 404 321 83
R2 0.70 0.79 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.33
Notes:All regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects as well as GDP per capita (PPP adjusted),
GDP growth, and the share of workers in working age population between twenty-ﬁve and
ﬁfty-four and ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-four. We instrument Social Security contributions (measures
in EPV) with the dependency ratio, computed as the ratio of the population sixty-ﬁve and
older to the working age population (ﬁfteen–sixty-four). Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. See table 8 for explanations of abbreviations.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.However, we ﬁnd robust evidence that social security contributions are
not fully shifted to workers. Payroll taxation tends to reduce employment
and increase unemployment rates across samples and speciﬁcations. At the
aggregate level, our analyses of reforms intended to increase the link be-
tween contributions and payments show mixed results.
I.6 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
Summarizing an entire school of thought, Freeman (2000, 3) writes that
“the institutional organization of the labor market has identiﬁable large
eﬀects on distribution, but modest hard-to-uncover eﬀects on eﬃciency.”
This view is shared by many economists. However, the microevidence sum-
marized in this volume suggests that mandated beneﬁts and job security
regulations have a substantial allocative impact both in Latin America and
in OECD countries.
What policy lessons can be drawn from the essays in this volume? The ev-
idence assembled in this volume suggests that labor market regulations are
an inequality-increasing mechanism, because some workers beneﬁt while
many others are hurt. The beneﬁts of programs funded with mandatory
payroll contributions should be weighed against their costs in terms of em-
ployment. Funding such programs with general revenues does not neces-
sarily reduce employment costs (see Nickell 1997), but strengthening the
link between payments and beneﬁts contributes to shifting the cost of such
programs to workers, at least in the long run. Regulation acts unevenly
across diﬀerent groups in society. Young, uneducated, and rural workers are
much less likely to enjoy coverage than older, skilled, and urban workers.
While the aggregate evidence on the eﬀects of job security on the level of
employment is inconclusive, the microstudies assembled here ﬁnd a large
and negative eﬀect of job security on employment. Individual country
studies based on microdata reduce the fragility and lack of robustness
problems that pervade the cross section of countries’ time series literature.
I.6.1 Lessons For Future Research
While these essays demonstrate that ﬁrms and workers respond to in-
centives in predictable ways and that regulation reduces employment and
labor market turnover, more precise quantitative estimates would be desir-
able. We conclude with a discussion of the main areas in which future re-
search could improve upon the current estimates.
Incidence of Payroll Taxes and General Equilibrium
Several essays in this volume take signiﬁcant steps toward addressing
whether workers accept lower wages if they receive mandated beneﬁts.
These estimates of incidence can be improved. Comparing the wages of
covered and uncovered sectors to see if covered workers get lower wages, as
Introduction 85in Cárdenas and Bernal (chap. 4 in this volume) and several other essays in
this volume, fails to control for self-selection into these sectors, which sev-
eral studies in this volume have documented to be important. The method
fails to adjust for general equilibrium eﬀects arising from induced entry
and exit and the willingness of workers to purchase beneﬁts by accepting
reduced wages.
The most comprehensive approach to the incidence question is the anal-
ysis of Marrufo (2001), which ﬁnds that controlling for self-selection and
accounting for general equilibrium eﬀects substantially aﬀects estimates of
tax incidence, and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates understate the true
extent of wage adjustment. As argued by Kugler, the simple diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences method is downward biased so that the estimates reported in
this volume are conservative.
Dynamic Labor Demand
The empirical models of labor demand estimated by the authors in this
volume are traditional static models and dynamic labor demand models
based on the assumption of symmetric adjustment costs. They abstract
from the asymmetries in labor demand that are produced by severance and
indemnity systems. Appendix B sketches out the main ideas in the asym-
metric demand literature using a two-period model. Alonso-Borrego and
Aguirregabiria (1999) develop the econometrics needed to estimate such
models, but the methods remain to be implemented on LAC data. Given
that all of the labor demand models estimated in this book assume sym-
metric adjustment costs, it would be productive to rework these studies us-
ing more advanced methods. As previously noted, the inconclusive evi-
dence on the eﬀect of job security on ﬁrm adjustment dynamics may be an
artifact of the symmetry assumption.
In this class of models, it would also be useful to account for general
equilibrium eﬀects of entry and exit of ﬁrms. Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) demonstrate that, in principle, accounting for general equilibrium
eﬀects can reverse the predictions of partial equilibrium models.
Accounting for Nonstationarity
All of the duration models used to determine the impacts of regulation
on labor market turnover assume stationary environments. Any student of
Latin America knows how poor that assumption is. The high volatility of
economic outcomes in Latin America suggests that this assumption does
not adequately characterize the region. Accounting for nonstationarity
more systematically would improve econometric estimates of behavioral
parameters for the region.
Accounting for the Eﬀects of Regulation on Output
All of the labor demand studies estimate output-constant wage elastici-
ties. Abstracting from the potentially important econometric problem of
86 James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagésendogeneity of output, output-constant demand functions are more ro-
bust because they allow the analyst to abstract from product market ad-
justments to relative price changes. At the ﬁrm level, the output-constant
eﬀects of regulation understate the total eﬀect of regulation if regulation
raises the marginal cost of labor to the ﬁrm and costs cannot be shifted
onto wages or other factor costs. The estimates reported here underesti-
mate the full disemployment eﬀects of deregulation in sectors adversely im-
pacted. At the level of the national economy, the eﬀects are more ambigu-
ous because the burden of regulation may impact industries diﬀerently
although it will still have eﬃciency losses by distorting sectoral allocations.
In a closed economy, relative output prices adjust and will lead to an ex-
pansion of output in those sectors least impacted. So in those sectors,
greater regulation may lead to greater employment. In an open economy
facing world prices, when regulations are not accommodated by a down-
ward adjustment of factor prices, regulation reduces output and accentu-
ates reductions in employment.
A complete analysis of the impact of regulation would require account-
ing for both product market and factor market adjustments. The pre-
sumption is that a full account would produce disemployment eﬀect of reg-
ulation on the overall economy, but not necessarily in each sector.
Notice, however, that even if wages adjust fully and there are no adverse
eﬀects of regulation on labor demand, regulation may still have substantial
eﬀects on the welfare of workers. If a job security mandate is oﬀset by lower
wages, worker welfare is not necessarily improved, at least not for all work-
ers. It may be higher or lower depending on how much the mandate diﬀers
from what workers and ﬁrms would mutually agree upon in an unregulated
environment.
Accounting for Serial Correlation
While most of the studies summarized in this volume measure the cost
of regulations by elaborating direct monetary measures of their cost to em-
ployers, several authors use the length of the lag (the speed of adjustment)
as an alternative measure of the cost of regulation facing the ﬁrm. The in-
tuition supporting this is based on the original work of Holt et al. (1960),
as previously described in section I.4.2.
In the simple model of equations (2) and (3), if we introduce an error
term and an implicit theory of optimal employment as a function of the
real wage, W t, we obtain
(4) nt ∗   a   bW t   εt, b   0.
If εt is serially correlated, we obtain
(5) εt    εt 1   ut,
where ut has zero mean and is independently and identically distributed,
and   is the ﬁrst-order serial correlation. Analysts obtain a high estimated
Introduction 87value of   (the coeﬃcient on lagged labor) from a least squares estimation
that does not correct for serial correlation because
(6) nt   (1    )(a   bW t)    nt 1   (1    )εt.
If 1    1 and   0, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of   are up-
ward biased. An asymptotically unbiased estimator that accounts for this
serial correlation is based on
(7) nt   (1    )(1    )a   (1    )b(W t    W t 1)   (    )nt 1      nt 2
  (1    )ut,
which is derived from equation (6) by lagging it one period, solving for (1 –
 )εt–1, writing εt    εt–1   ut in equation (6) and substituting for εt–1. This
bias is especially important in making cross-country comparisons where
serial correlation coeﬃcients may diﬀer greatly across economies. For
studies of regulations in a single country, this bias will not aﬀect estimates
of the relative cost of diﬀerent reforms if the serial correlation pattern is in-
variant across reforms. However, no meaning can be attached to the ab-
solute value of the lag coeﬃcient.
This conventional model assumes symmetric hiring and ﬁring costs. Yet
even in the original Holt et al. (1960) study, this assumption was only in-
troduced as a mathematically simplifying one that was contrary to their ev-
idence. A more accurate description of the data from Latin America and
other regions is that there are substantial asymmetric adjustment costs.
A measurement model accounting for asymmetric adjustment costs re-
quires a new econometric approach. In work available on request, we con-
sider a model of asymmetric hiring and ﬁring costs based on Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993). The coeﬃcient on lagged labor is not necessarily mo-
notonic in the cost of labor regulations. This may account for the ambigu-
ous evidence on the impact of regulation on the cost of adjustment ob-
tained from the conventional estimates.32
I.6.2 Taking Stock
Although there is clearly room for improvement, the body of evidence
summarized in this chapter and reported in this book demonstrates that
regulation matters, that the choice of labor market institutions matters,
and that further labor reforms oﬀer the promise of promoting both eﬃ-
ciency and equity across demographic groups in Latin America. They
demonstrate the power of microdata to answer important questions when
the evidence from cross-country macro time series is ambiguous.
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32. The intuition behind this result is simple. Diﬀerent serial correlation-ﬁxed cost pairs
produce the same lagged employment coeﬃcient. This is also possible in the simple model (6).
So it is possible that a regime with higher labor transition costs is also one with lower serial
correlation in shocks and so would display a lower estimated lag and a faster adjustment rate.
See Barbarino and Heckman (2003).Appendix A
Deﬁnitions and Sources of Variables Used in Section I.5
For the empirical analysis described in section I.5, we build an unbalanced
panel data covering the period 1983–1999. Table A.3 describes the vari-
ables and their sources. Table A.4 describes the countries and the years
covered in our sample.
Computation of Labor Market Regulation Measures
Advance Notice and Indemnities for Dismissal
OECD Countries
We gather information on advance notice and indemnities for dismissal
for OECD countries from the OECD Employment Outlook table 2.A.2,
“Required Notice and Severance Pay for Individual Dismissal” (1999, 94–
96), which summarizes the “case of a regular employee with tenure beyond
any trial period, dismissed on personal grounds or economic redundancy
but without fault.” For countries in which it is likely for individual dismis-
sals to be considered “unjust” (measured as those countries to which the
OECD gives a score of 2 or more in a 1–3 scale in table 2.A.4, 100)—that
is, countries where a “transfer and or retraining to adapt to diﬀerent work
must be attempted prior to dismissal” and where “worker capability can-
not be ground for dismissal”—we consider the information summarized
in the table entitled “Compensation and Related Remedies Following Un-
justiﬁed Dismissal.” From this table we see that, for this subset of coun-
tries, in at least one country unjust dismissals carry a much higher penalty.
This is the case of Spain. We make this contingency explicit by computing
the expected severance pay by assigning a 1/2 probability that a dismissal
will be considered unfair and will carry the higher severance pay that the
law mandates in this event. We obtain information on labor reforms from
table 2.1 (OECD 1999, 53), which describes the main changes in legislation
since the mid-1980s. We also compare the information described in OECD
(1999) with that presented in Grubb and Wells (1993). If they diverge, we
take the information in the latter to be valid up to 1993, while we take the
information presented in OECD (1999) to be valid from 1997 onward. For
the years in between, the index has a missing value. There are only four
countries where there are some divergences between the former and the lat-
ter source. This is the case of Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, and Sweden.
Finally, in countries where the law prescribes diﬀerent severance pay and
advance notice for blue- and white-collar workers, we compute the cost of
dismissal as the unweighted average for the two groups. For Hungary, Ko-
Introduction 89rea, New Zealand, and Turkey, the job security measures only take non-
missing values from 1990 onward because we could not ﬁnd legal infor-
mation for former years. To construct our index, we do not consider upper
monetary limits. In addition, we do not consider beneﬁts that ﬁrms pay or
unions can obtain for their workers that exceed the legal mandatory. Fi-
nally, we do not consider what workers can get in courts if they sue their
employers.
The following are individual country notes. In Australia, we consider the
severance pay awarded to workers dismissed for redundancy. For Canada,
we take the maximum of the severance pay and advance notice mandated
by the federal and the local jurisdiction. In Greece, for white-collar work-
ers, advance notice can be waived if full severance pay is given. We thereby
assume that ﬁrms pay in full to avoid paying additional advance notice. In
Ireland, the awarded severance pay depends on the age of the worker. We
assume that workers receive 0.18 monthly wages per year worked, which
corresponds to the (unweighted) average of half of one week per year
worked (workers under the age of forty-one) and one week per year worked
(workers over the age of forty-one). In Norway, after ten years of tenure,
notice period increases with age. To capture this eﬀect, we have increased
notice period from three months to four and ﬁve in the case of individuals
of more than ﬁfteen years of tenure. For Spain, we adjust the severance pay
obtained in case of just dismissal by the fact that many dismissals are con-
sidered unjust. We therefore weigh mandatory dismissals in case of just
and unjust causes by a probability of 1/2 for each event.
Latin America
We consider the legal information, summarized in tables A.1 and A.2,
obtained from the Ministries of Labor of individual countries.
In Brazil, employers are required to deposit 8 percent of a workers’ wage
in individual workers’ accounts, which accrue interest rates. In case of a
ﬁrm initiated dismissal, ﬁrms are required to pay a worker severance pay
that is a given fraction,  , of what a worker owns in his individual account.
The 1988 constitutional reform increased this share from 0.1 to 0.4 of the
total amount in the fund. To compute the fraction of what is accrued in the
individual fund, we assume that the interest rate equals the discount rate.




 i 1(1    )(i)    ,
where idenotes tenure at the ﬁrm,  is the per period probability of survival
(equal to 0.88), and T denotes the maximum tenure of a worker in a ﬁrm,
which is assumed to be equal to twenty. In Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
and Dominican Republic, a constant advance notice equal to one month
is assumed. In Peru, there were reforms in job security in 1991, 1995, and






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.1996. Tables A.1 and A.2 only report the schedule as in 1990 and in 1999.
See Saavedra and Torero (chap. 2 in this volume) for a more detailed de-
scription of the changes in the Peruvian labor code throughout the 1990s.
Seniority Pay
Seniority payments only exist in Latin America. There are two kinds. In
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, workers deposit 1/12 of their






where T   20. This reﬂects the discounted value of a stream of payments
equivalent to one month of pay per year. For Colombia, Kugler (chap. 3
in this volume) reports that before the 1990 labor reform, workers were en-
titled to one month of salary per year of work as a seniority fund upon
separation independent of the cause of separation. However, partial with-
drawals were allowed and deducted in nominal terms from the ﬁnal pay-
ment, implying a “double retroactivity” with an estimated cost of 35 per-
cent of the total payments of seniority pay in the manufacturing sector. We
therefore apply a surcharge of 35 percent to the legislated schedule for sen-
iority pay during the period before 1990.
Instead, in Venezuela and Panama, labor codes mandate a mandatory
seniority payment that is computed as multiples of the last wage per year




 i 1(1    )( j   i),
where  jdenotes multiples of the last wage, and idenotes tenure at the ﬁrm.
In Venezuela, the legal codes speciﬁed a seniority pay of one monthly wage
per year of work ( j 1). After the 1997, seniority pay was increased to two
monthly wages per year of work ( j   2). Notice that this formula assumes
that the probability of worker turnover is identical to the probability of job
turnover. Because, in general, worker turnover rates tend to be higher than
job turnover rates, we also experimented with a probability of worker
turnover equal to two times and three times the probability of job turnover.
The cost of seniority pay declines with the rate of turnover (because the
probability of surviving in the ﬁrm and obtaining larger amounts declines).
Our estimated results are robust to diﬀerent assumptions in the worker
turnover rate.
Social Security Regulations
Information provided by Social Security Programs Throughout the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.security contributions include contributions by employers and employees
to old age, disability and death, sickness and maternity, work injury, un-
employment insurance, and family allowances programs. Because this in-
formation is only available biannually, we extend the data to yearly fre-
quency in two alternative ways—by interpolating or by inputting each
missing data value with the value in the former year. The results of our em-
pirical analysis do not vary with the method used. The results also do not
vary when we consider only the original biannual data.
For Argentina, we obtained direct information from the country. Rates
apply to Buenos Aires. In all countries, we consider the rates applied to
wage earners. We do not include contributions made by the government to
fund social security programs. In cases where contributions diﬀer across
individuals, states, or industry risk, only one rate is chosen, and the choice
varies somewhat across countries. However, the same criterion is used
within countries across time. This somewhat reduces cross-country com-
parability but preserves across time comparability within countries.
Social Security Reform
The variable Reform takes a value of 1 after a country has implemented
a social security reform that totally or partially replaces a pay-as-you-go
system by an individual capitalization system. Based on social security re-
forms information summarized in Lora and Pagés (2000), this variable
takes the value of 1 in Chile on and after 1981, in Colombia on and after
1994, in Argentina on and after 1994, in Uruguay on and after 1996, in Mex-
ico and Bolivia on and after 1997, and in El Salvador on and after 1998.
Appendix B
Dynamic Demand Speciﬁcations
All of the papers on labor demand in this volume ignore the asymmetric
nature of labor adjustment costs. In this appendix, we explore the conse-
quences of this asymmetry on labor demand. The main conclusion is that
static and dynamic costs of labor have separate eﬀects on labor demand,
and in general no scalar index adequately summarizes these costs. In order
to specify labor demand functions in the presence of asymmetric hiring
and ﬁring costs, it is convenient to use a two-period model. Such a model
is implicit in Kugler (chap. 3 in this volume). Let f( ) denote output as a
function of labor input  . Let  be a second period productivity shock. It is
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We thank Jagadeesh Sivadasan for helpful comments on this appendix.normalized against a ﬁrst-period productivity shock of 1. We assume, for
simplicity, that workers do not quit once they are hired.
Labor hired in period one is  1. Labor employed in period two is  2    1
   .   is thus the change in the stock of period-one labor. Spot wage W is
assumed to be common in both periods, and is assumed to be exogenous to
the ﬁrm. The cost of ﬁring a worker is C. Oﬀsetting this cost is the saving
in wages. The cost of hiring a worker is the wage. Asymmetry arises when
C 0. Assume no discounting. Labor  1is kept on in period two unless sec-
ond-period demand shocks ( ) are suﬃciently low. The ﬁrm maximizes
proﬁts
(B1) f( 1)   W 1   E[ f( 1    )   W( 1    )   CMax(  , 0)],
where the ﬁrst-period labor productivity is normalized to 1.
We assume that the support of  is (0,  ) and that  is an (absolutely con-
tinuous) random variable. If   1 with probability 1, the ﬁrm in the sec-
ond period wants   0. Labor productivity has increased when  is bigger
than its ﬁrst-period value, which implicitly is set at 1.
The presence of second-period ﬁring costs inhibits hiring in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. Thus, anticipating the possibility of an adverse shock in the second
period, the ﬁrm hires less labor than it would hire in the ﬁrst period in the
absence of ﬁring costs. If, for the sake of making an heuristic argument, we
characterize the ﬁrm as myopically maximizing period-by-period proﬁts,
the ﬁrm acts as if the ﬁrst-period productivity shock is less than 1 in mak-
ing its ﬁrst-period decisions and hires less labor than it would if there were
no second-period ﬁring costs. Letting     be the value of the “as if” ﬁrst-
period productivity shock, if       in period two, then  f ( 2)   W and
 2   [ f ]–1(W/ )    1.
If      , the ﬁrm stays put at  1 so that  1    2 and   0. If productivity
is below    , the ﬁrm may still keep its workforce at  1  2because it is costly
to ﬁre labor. We now determine the lower bound on   that gives rise to in-
action. For a ﬁxed  1, the two required conditions for inaction (  0) are
 f ( 1)   W, so it pays in gross terms to get rid of a unit of  1, and  f ( 1)  
W – C, so it does not pay in net terms. Thus the inequalities determining
the zone of inaction are (for a given  1)
W   C    f ( 1)   W.
The lower boundary  ∗ is (W – C)/( f ( 1))    ∗. Holding  1 ﬁxed, raising
C lowers the threshold  ∗. Thus the zone of inaction for a given ( 1, C) is
 ∗       , where      W/( f ( 1)).
The ﬁrst order condition for  1 is f ( 1) – W   E( f ( 1    ) – W )   0,
where   0 if  ∗       ,   0 if     ∗, and   0 if      . From con-
cavity,  1 is decreasing in cost C. Intuitively, ﬁrms with high ﬁring costs
hold back on hiring  1. There is an option value of holding back on hiring
Introduction 101 1 to avoid the cost of ﬁring unwanted second-period labor. In order to
characterize  1, we must ﬁrst characterize  ( 1).
Second-Period (Conditional on  1) Demand Functions
Letting  – denote the reduction in the stock of labor and    be the ex-
pansion of such stock, we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition for  – as
 f ( 1     )   W   C
or





Take  1as given. Observe that if 0     ∗,   0. Deﬁne ϕ f –1. Observe
that from concavity ϕ  0. Then





Observe that at     ∗,  –   0. If      ,  f ( 1     )   W and ( 1     )  
ϕ(W/ ). If  ∗       , the ﬁrm operates at  1 and   0. If     ∗,  f ( 1
   –)   W – C and  1    –   ϕ([W – C]/ ). Deﬁne g( ) as the density of
 . Given  1, expected demand in period two (averaged over the   states) is,
for a given ﬁrm,
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The positivity of this ﬁnal expression arises from the fact that as C in-
creases, the ﬁrm is more risk averse ( ∗ falls) so that it is more likely that it
hires labor in the second period.
If   is iid across ﬁrms in period 2, and independently and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) across time, then the mean conditional (on  1) labor de-
mand function is not a direct function of W   Pr(0      ∗)C, which, in
this simple framework, is the measure of labor cost used in Heckman and







, C,  1)





, C,  1)
    0
so that ∂E( 2W, C,  1)/∂W is larger in absolute value than ∂E( 2W, C,
 1)/∂C, although they are of opposite signs.
This analysis suggests that empirical speciﬁcations of labor demand
functions should use C and W separately. W corresponds to static costs as
deﬁned in the text. C corresponds to costs of adjustment. The OLS regres-
sions of conditional (on  1) demand functions do not identify the standard
substitution terms used in static demand analysis.
One way to avoid problems with direct estimation of labor demand func-
tions is to estimate production functions. These can be used to derive the
demand functions given ﬁxed costs without directly estimating demand
functions with ﬁxed costs.
First-Period Demand Functions
These are obtained by substituting each state-contingent  2    1   de-
mand function into expression (B1) and maximizing with respect to  1. As
in the analysis of the second period demand function, W   Pr(0    
 ∗)C is not an appropriate marginal price in any state. Substituting into
expression (B1) and making the dependence of  – and    on W, C,  1 ex-
plicit, we obtain total proﬁts (as perceived in the ﬁrst period) as




{ f [ 1    (W, C,  1,  )]  (W C)   (W, C,  1)  W 1}g( )d 
  
   
 ∗ [ f( 1)   W 1]g( )d 
  
 
   
{ f [ 1     (W, C,  1)]   W[ 1     (W, C,  1)]}g( )d .
Introduction 103Assuming an interior solution, and using the envelope theorem,
f ( 1)   W   
 ∗
0
{ f [ 1     (W, C,  1,  )]   W}g( )d 
  
   
 ∗ [ f ( 1)   W]g( )d  0,
so the ﬁrst period demand obtained as the solution to this equation   is a
function of W and C separately and not W   Pr(0      ∗)C. Observe,
trivially, that the  1 obtained as a solution of this ﬁrst-order condition is
lower than the  1 obtained when C   0. This rationalizes our choice of
      1 in the heuristic solution outlined above.
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